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Executive Summary  
Background  
The Education Maintenance Allowance (EMA) was a cash transfer worth up to £1,200 
per year, paid to 16- to 19-year-olds from low-income households conditional on post-
compulsory education participation. The EMA was intended to help achieve the 
government’s priority of closing the gap in attainment between those from poorer and 
more affluent backgrounds, and ensuring 16- to 19-year-olds participate in and benefit 
from a place in education or training. It was introduced in 2004 and was found to be 
reasonably successful in raising participation amongst those eligible for the award; 
Dearden et al. (2009) estimate that the EMA increased Year 12 participation by 4.5 
percentage points amongst this group.  
 
However, the EMA was considered to have a high deadweight cost, meaning that a large 
number of EMA recipients would have stayed in education even without it. In 2010/11, an 
estimated 57% of 560,000 individuals participating in education England were eligible for 
some form of the award, which meant its total cost was high: around £564 million in 
2010/11. Despite the findings in Deaden et al. (2009) that expected longer-term savings 
through higher tax revenues and lower benefit payments outweighed the up-front costs, 
the EMA was abolished in England and replaced with the “16 to 19 Bursary Fund” in 
September 2011. The 16 to 19 Bursary Fund differed from the EMA in two key ways. 
First, it had a significantly lower budget of £180 million in 2011/12, £384 million less than 
the 2010/11 EMA in nominal terms. Second, whereas for the EMA grant amounts were 
clearly defined and related to parental income, under the 16 to 19 Bursary the majority of 
allocation was essentially discretionary.1 Schools, colleges and training providers would 
receive an overall budget for spending on Bursaries but could choose their own eligibility 
schemes in terms of the amount per award, how they were paid (cash or in kind) and 
how frequently they were paid (e.g. weekly, termly or yearly).  
 
The Institute of Education and the Institute for Fiscal Studies were commissioned by the 
Department for Education (DfE) to undertake a statistical impact analysis of this reform. 
This report provides estimates of the policy’s impact on participation and attainment 
during the 2011/12 and 2012/13 academic years, and provides a cost–benefit analysis of 
the policy taking into account effects on lifetime earnings and exchequer tax receipts and 
benefit payments. The study is part of the Department for Education’s wider research on 
the 16 to 19 Bursary Fund, which includes a separately commissioned process 
evaluation investigating the characteristics of pupils receiving the Bursary, its 
administration and perceived impact. 
1 A number of “Defined Vulnerable Group” Bursaries were also made available, which were subject to strict eligibility criteria and 
not awarded on a discretionary basis. These account for a small fraction of the overall number of bursaries awarded, however.  
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Methods  
The primary outcomes analysed in this report are full-time (FT) participation2 in post-16 
education and whether learners had achieved the Level 2 or 3 attainment3 threshold by 
the end of the academic year in which they turned 18. The estimated impacts should be 
interpreted as the changes in participation and attainment rates compared to a 
hypothetical no-reform scenario where the EMA had remained in place and unchanged in 
2011/12 and 2012/13. It is not an estimate of its effect compared to no financial support 
for learners aged 16 to 19. We do not observe whether or not individuals received a 
Bursary in our data. Our estimates are therefore reported at the population level and 
separately for the group of individuals who would have been eligible for the EMA if it had 
continued.  
 
Measuring the impacts of the policy reform is complicated by the fact that it was 
implemented for all young people in England at the same time. With no true control 
group, it is challenging to identify a baseline against which outcomes in 2011/12 and 
2012/13 can be compared. In order to estimate the causal impact we need to estimate 
what participation and attainment rates would have been in 2011/12 and 2012/13 had 
there been no reform to EMA. We do this by using groups that were never eligible for the 
EMA as the control group.  
 
This analysis is based on the administrative data for state school pupils who were in Year 
11 between 2005/06 and 2011/12. It tracks post-16 education outcomes for lower-income 
pupils – whom it is believed would have been eligible for EMA had it been retained – 
against the same outcomes for a group of pupils whose family income was just too high 
for them to have ever been eligible for EMA. The latter group is assumed to have been 
unaffected by the reform and therefore the change in their observed post-16 education 
outcomes after the reform is taken to be a reliable guide to the changes that would have 
occurred to our groups who are affected by the policy change. We show that prior to the 
reform, all our groups did move in parallel in terms of participation and attainment. We 
assume that this would have continued if there had been no reform. Using this 
assumption (the so-called common trends assumption) we can identify the causal impact 
of the introduction of the 16 to 19 Bursary using a ‘difference in difference’ (DiD) 
methodology. We do a number of robustness checks to check our methodological 
approach. 
 
2 Participation indicators come from two sources: the school census and the Individualised Learner Record (ILR) data. If an 
individual is present in the school census and not the ILR, they are classified as participating full time. If they are in the ILR, they 
are classified as being in full-time participation if their mode of study indicator in the ILR is set equal to 1 (full time, full-year) or 2 
(full time, part-year). The alternative for this variable is 3, which indicates part-time study.  
3 Level 2 attainment is qualifications of at least five A*-C GCSEs or equivalent, while Level 3 attainment is at least two A Levels or 
equivalent via non-academic qualifications. 
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An important feature of the analysis is that it is performed without the direct observation 
of income in the available data. EMA eligibility is estimated through family income figures 
imputed on the basis of other socio-economic characteristics, such as Free School Meals 
and local neighbourhood characteristics,4 and their relationship with income observed in 
the nationally representative Family Resources Survey (FRS). The result of this 
necessary but imperfect imputation is that the results almost certainly underestimate the 
true effect of the policy change. Under the old EMA policy, children could get some EMA 
if their family income was £30,810 or below. The adopted approach attempts to minimise 
the underestimation by including individuals with incomes up to £35,000 in our ‘EMA-
eligible’ group, reducing the extent to which our control group contains EMA-eligible 
individuals. This means that our estimates of impact are for a group slightly larger than 
the true EMA-eligible group,5 but ensures that our control group is unlikely to contain 
individuals who would have been eligible for the EMA. It also means that our estimate of 
the overall impact on the whole cohort should be robust, as long as our modified DiD 
assumptions hold. 
Impact on participation and attainment 
The headline participation and attainment effects are shown in Table i.6 Since we have 
two post-reform years of data, these impacts are the average across the two years and 
this analysis supersedes that of the interim report (Britton et al., 2014). The first row 
shows that the estimated effect of the implementation of the policy led to a 1.6 
percentage points (ppts) fall in FT participation amongst Year 12 students who would 
otherwise have been eligible for the full EMA award. This translates into a fall from 82.1% 
to 80.5% for this group. In other words, their participation rate in FT education in Year 12 
would have been 1.6 ppts higher on average in 2011/12 and 2012/13 had there been no 
reform to EMA. The impact among the wider group of pupils who would have been 
eligible for any level of EMA support is 1.4 ppts, which translates into a fall amongst the 
cohort as a whole of 0.9 ppts, from 85.0% to 84.1%. For the Year 13 transition cohort, 
there was a 2.0 ppt fall in FT participation among the poorest students, who would have 
previously been eligible for the full EMA, and a 1.7 ppt fall among pupils who would 
previously have been eligible for any EMA. This translates into a reduction of 1.0 ppt 
across the entire cohort, from 71.6% to 70.6%. 
  
4 The local neighbourhood characteristics are: Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) and Income Deprivation Affecting Children 
Index (IDACI) scores, the ACORN socio-economic classification and the proportion of households that are owner-occupiers. 
5 For the remainder of the report, when we refer to the EMA-eligible group we are referring to this slightly larger group and 
hence are likely to be underestimating the impact for those who are eligible for the EMA. Our overall estimate of income for the 
whole cohort will not suffer from this problem.  
6 Participation and attainment figures in Table i may differ from official government statistics due to slight differences in 
methodologies used.  
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1Table i: Summary of estimated impacts on attainment and participation 
 Impact on lowest-income 
pupils (who would have 
been eligible for 
maximum EMA support) 
Impact across all 
pupils who would have 
been eligible for any 
EMA support 
Impact across 
cohort as a whole 
Y12 FT participation -1.56ppts 
(80.5%) 
-1.44ppts 
(81.4%) 
-0.87ppts 
(84.1%) 
Y13 FT participation -2.02ppts 
(65.2%) 
-1.69ppts 
(66.5%) 
-1.02ppts 
(70.6%) 
L2 by 18 attainment -2.25ppts 
(80.2%) 
-1.83ppts 
(82.4%) 
-1.11ppts 
(87.2%) 
L3 by 18 attainment -0.45ppts 
(34.3%) 
-0.27pptsᶧ 
(38.1%) 
-0.16pptsᶧ 
(48.4%) 
The figures in the parentheses give the actual average post-reform percentages. ᶧ Indicates not statistically 
significant (at the 5% level).  
 
The impacts on attainment are largest for the poorest students, defined as those who 
would have been eligible for the full EMA award. We estimate that there was a 2.3 ppt fall 
in the Level 2 achievement rate by age 18, leading to a 1.1 ppt fall across the whole Year 
13 cohort, from 88.3% to 87.2%. For Level 3 achievement, the effect is much smaller at 
0.5 ppts for those who would have been eligible for the full grant, with no statistically 
significant impact across the whole eligible group or the cohort as a whole.  
 
An important benchmark with which to compare the participation results is the effect of 
the introduction of the EMA on participation rates estimated by Dearden et al. (2009). 
They estimate that participation amongst Year 12s increased by 4.5 percentage points 
amongst those eligible for some form of the EMA. There are two important caveats to this 
estimate, however. First, it may have overestimated the true effect as the estimate was 
taken from the EMA pilot, which targeted deprived areas of England, which may consist 
of individuals more responsive to the grant. Second, the real value of the EMA was 
considerably lower in 2010/11 than during the pilot, in 1999: in fact the maximum grant 
available did not increase in nominal terms at all, remaining constant at £30 per week.  
 
There is some evidence of a stronger effect – in particular, for Level 2 attainment – in the 
second year of the reform, suggesting that the true effects are muted slightly by the 
transitional year and that longer-term impacts might be greater than those found on 
average across the period here.7  
Due to methodological concerns, we are unable to estimate the effects of the policy on 
part-time participation rates and therefore overall participation rates. If some individuals’ 
response to the reform were to substitute into part-time education from full-time 
7 This is consistent with the estimates in the 2011/12 interim report (Britton et al., 2014) being smaller in magnitude.  
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education, then our estimated impact on full-time participation rates would be unaffected. 
However, because we cannot estimate the impact on part-time education, for cost–
benefit analysis we have to assume that this remains unchanged. If the reform actually 
increased part-time education then this would result in us overstating the overall negative 
participation effects. Due to insufficient years of observations we are also unable to 
investigate the extent to which people have changed their behaviour so that they take 
time away then return to education as a result of the reform.  
Finally, and again due to methodological concerns, we are unable to obtain robust 
estimates of subgroup effects other than by gender, where we find no evidence of 
significant differences in impacts. We were not able to investigate whether the effect was 
larger for certain ethnic groups or for different regions or other groups of interest as the 
common trends assumption does not appear realistic for these groups individually. 
Cost–benefit analysis  
To assess the value for money of the policy change, the short-run savings from a 
reduction in financial support and the funding of education places of £459 million (in 
September 2014 prices) can be compared to the impacts on participation. Using the 
estimates discussed above, we estimate that on average in 2011/12 and 2012/13, there 
were 23 fewer individuals in full-time education, 14 fewer individuals achieving Level 2 
qualifications and 2 fewer individuals achieving Level 3 qualifications per £1 million 
saved. This does not take into account any part-time participation effect. Due to the 
misclassification error discussed above, these estimates are likely to underestimate the 
true effect. In our alternative specification using individuals with very high parental 
income as the control group, the equivalent figures are 34 fewer individuals participating 
in education, 19 fewer Level 2 achievers and 7 fewer Level 3 achievers per £1 million 
saved. As discussed above the figures using this control group are likely to be less 
affected by the misclassification bias, but may not be a good representation of the 
changes in participation that would have occurred in the absence of the policy reform for 
our EMA-eligible groups.  
However, this does not take into account the long-run costs associated with the policy or 
the consequences of alternative uses of the immediate cash savings. To the extent that 
individuals become less educated as a result of the policy, lifetime earnings and hence 
exchequer tax receipts will be affected. Through a simulated model of lifetime earnings 
we find that the average discounted present value cost of lost earnings is £6,735 per 
household affected by the policy change. This translates into an estimated loss to the 
exchequer of £2,762 per affected household in discounted present value terms, through 
reduced tax receipts and increased benefit payments, offsetting the immediate savings.  
Overall, on central estimates using this methodology the short-run savings associated 
with the policy are in aggregate outweighed by the long-run losses: we estimate an 
overall loss to the exchequer of £84 million, modelling earnings at the household level 
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including dynamics in family formation. There is a very high degree of uncertainty 
associated with these figures due to the difficulties associated with modelling lifetime 
earnings effects for the future and having to produce models using proxy variables. As 
such, our estimated confidence intervals span zero and when we do not account for 
household-level effects we estimate a small net saving to government. 
We believe these estimates are likely to understate the true impact, for several reasons. 
First, the misclassification error associated with our estimates suggests we are 
underestimating the true effect on attainment – for example, in the extreme case of using 
the highest income group as a comparison group, the loss to the government increases 
from £84 million to £466 million. Second, there appears to be evidence of a stronger 
effect in the second year, meaning the average impact across the two years is muted by 
the transitional phase between policies. This appears to be particularly important for 
Level 2 attainment, which is a key part of our cost–benefit analysis. Third, we look only at 
the wage effect and do not account for wider productivity effects, which are likely to be 
larger (e.g. see Dearden, Reed and van Reenen, 2006), or the effect on other outcomes 
such as health or crime.  
Conclusion 
The estimates presented here suggest that abolishing EMA and introducing the 16 to 19 
Bursary Fund had a relatively modest effect on participation and attainment in the first 
two years of implementation, but that this disproportionately affected low-income young 
people.  
Importantly, it is likely that the overall impact estimates presented in this report 
underestimate the true impacts of the policy reform in question. Nevertheless, our cost–
benefit analysis estimates that the long-run costs from the policy outweigh the short-run 
savings, and that is without taking into account wider impacts of the policy, including the 
effects on productivity, crime or health. 
Of course, the analysis does not account for the economic benefits that accrue from 
alternative investments of the short-run savings. Those alternatives should be examined 
with a similar approach to that used here in order to assess their relative cost-
effectiveness.  
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1. Introduction 
The 16 to 19 Bursary Fund was implemented nationally in September 2011 as the 
replacement for the previous Education Maintenance Allowance (EMA). The policy 
intention was to preserve participation amongst individuals from low income 
backgrounds, but to reduce the associated deadweight cost. This involved a budget cut – 
from £564 million in England in 2010/11 to £180 million in 2011/12 – and a change in the 
allocation of funds. With the intention of providing more efficient and better targeted 
support for post-16 learning, allocation was delegated to sixth forms and colleges, 
allowing them to allocate most of the funding on a discretionary basis to the learners they 
deemed most in need of additional support. 
 
Prior to this, EMA eligibility had been dictated by clear guidelines: individuals were 
eligible for £30 per week if their parental income was below £20,818; £20 per week if 
parental income was between £20,818 and £25,521; and £10 per week if parental 
income was between £25,522 and £30,810. Individuals would receive their weekly 
payments so long as their attendance was sufficiently high. The Institute of Education 
and Institute for Fiscal Studies were commissioned by the Department for Education 
(DfE) to undertake an impact analysis of the policy change on participation and 
attainment as part of a wider evaluation including a separate process evaluation study 
(Lloyd et al., 2015). This report provides findings on the impacts of the policy on 
participation and attainment rates in 2011/12 and 2012/13. 
 
The EMA was closed to new applicants on 1 January 2011, and the new 16 to 19 
Bursary Fund arrangements were in place from September 2011 onwards. Pupils who 
started Year 13 in September 2011 were subject to transitional arrangements, whereby 
those who had previously successfully applied for a full EMA award of £30 a week were 
to receive a reduced EMA of £20 a week, while those who had previously claimed a 
partial EMA award of £10 or £20 a week would no longer receive EMA but could apply for 
support from the 16 to 19 Bursary Fund. Meanwhile, pupils starting Year 12 in September 
2011 faced the new bursary arrangements only. 
 
The new bursary arrangements consist of two types of award. The first is defined 
vulnerable group bursaries, which have clear eligibility criteria for post-16 providers to 
follow and are worth up to £1,200 per year (this is equal to the maximum EMA award). 
Only a small number of individuals are eligible for these – approximately 2% of the cohort 
in education and work based learning received them in 2013/14 according to the process 
evaluation. The second type is discretionary bursaries, with allocations determined by 
colleges and schools. Eligibility (based on whether the individual needs financial 
support), distribution (weekly, monthly or termly), amount (individuals can receive more 
than they would under the EMA) and conditions (dependent on attendance, attainment or 
behaviour) are all at their discretion. Any individual can apply for a discretionary bursary, 
though in practice it is unlikely to be awarded without evidence of financial need. 
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The analysis in this research briefing uses statistical techniques to provide estimates of 
the impact of replacing EMA with the 16 to 19 Bursary Fund. The outcomes analysed are 
full-time (FT) participation8 in post-16 education at school, college or training providers, 
and whether individuals had achieved the Level 2 or 3 attainment threshold by the end of 
the academic year in which they turned 189. The estimated impacts in this research 
briefing should be interpreted as the changes in participation and attainment rates 
compared to a hypothetical no-reform scenario where the EMA had been retained. They 
are not the impacts compared to a scenario of no 16 to 19 financial support. 
 
Measuring the impacts of the policy reform in question is complicated by the fact that the 
reform was implemented across England at the same time. With no true control group it 
is challenging to identify what participation and attainment rates would have been in 
2011/12 and 2012/13 had there been no reform to EMA. Reliably measuring this quantity 
is crucial, as it is the baseline to which the actual post-reform levels of participation and 
attainment should be compared, in order to isolate impacts that can be attributed to the 
policy reform itself. 
 
Briefly, this analysis compares the post-16 education outcomes for lower-income pupils – 
who would have been eligible for EMA in 2011/12 and 2012/13 had it been retained – 
against the same outcomes for pupils whose family income was slightly too high for them 
to have been eligible for EMA had it been retained. The latter group is assumed to have 
been unaffected by the reform, since they would not have been eligible for EMA anyway. 
Furthermore, it is assumed that the change in their observed post-16 education 
outcomes between ages 16 and 19 is a reliable guide to the change in education 
outcomes that would have been seen among lower-income pupils had there been no 
policy reform, despite them having different levels in these outcomes controlling for other 
factors. Pupils with family incomes just above the EMA eligibility income threshold are 
used as the basis for comparison in order to maximise the validity of this assumption, 
which is crucial to the ‘difference-in-difference’ (DiD) approach used here. 
 
The report also assesses the costs and benefits of the policy. The savings are in the 
short run, through the £384 million budget cut in 2011/12 and through fewer people being 
in education. The costs are generally in the long run, as individuals become less 
educated under the new policy and hence earn less through their lifetime. We estimate 
these long-run costs by estimating a simulated model of lifetime earnings that is 
8 Participation indicators come from two sources: the school census and the Individualised Learner Record (ILR) data. If an 
individual is present in the school census and not the ILR, they are classified as participating full time. If they are in the ILR, they 
are classified as being in full time participation if their mode of study indicator in the ILR is set equal to 1 (full-time, full-year) or 2 
(full-time, part-year). The alternatives (modes 3-6) in the ILR are all classified as part-time study.  
9 Level 2 attainment is qualifications of at least 5 A*-C GCSEs or equivalent, while Level 3 attainment is at least two A Levels or 
equivalent. In both cases we include non-academic qualifications with the academic qualifications. Unfortunately we are unable 
to obtain reliable estimates of the two separately. 
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dependent on highest education qualification, then running the simulated earnings 
through a model of taxes and benefits to estimate the total cost to the exchequer in lost 
tax receipts and increased benefit spending of having a slightly less well educated 
population. These costs are put in discounted present value terms for comparison with 
the short-run savings. It is important to recognise that estimating these long-run costs is a 
speculative exercise and comes with a high degree of uncertainty. 
 
This research briefing is structured as follows. Section 2 sets out in detail the challenges 
involved in reliably measuring the impacts of the reform on participation and attainment 
rates, and the approach proposed by this research to deal with them. It describes the 
data sources used and the information on outcomes and pupil characteristics that will 
frame the impact analysis. It also tests the likely validity of the proposed empirical 
approach and identifies the particular outcomes for which the proposed approach is most 
likely to provide reliable estimates. Section 3 then provides the estimated impacts of the 
reform on participation and attainment, both across the cohort as a whole and for specific 
groups of pupils. In Section 4 the robustness of the results to various checks is tested. 
Section 5 provides a cost–benefit analysis by evaluating the effect of the policy on 
lifetime earnings and the discounted present value of tax receipts to the exchequer. 
Section 6 concludes. 
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2. Impact analysis methodology 
This section describes the empirical challenges and approaches involved in robustly 
measuring the impact of the 16 to 19 Bursary Fund on post-16 participation and 
attainment rates. It also discusses the data, provides evidence on the likely suitability of 
the proposed approach and identifies the outcomes examined in the impact analysis. A 
description of the methodology for the cost–benefit analysis is provided in Section 5 
alongside the results.  
2.1 Evaluation design and methods  
The aim of this report is to measure the impact of the policy reform as the difference 
between the actual participation and attainment outcomes that were observed in 
2011/12-2012/13, and the participation and attainment outcomes that would have been 
observed in 2011/12-2012/13 had there been no policy reform. The latter cannot be 
measured directly as they relate to a hypothetical – often referred to as ‘counterfactual’ – 
scenario. The evaluation strategy must therefore use statistical techniques to best 
approximate the participation and attainment outcomes that would have been observed 
in the counterfactual scenario. A major challenge here is that the policy reform in 
question was implemented across the whole of England at the start of the 2011/12 
academic year. This means there are no easily identified areas or groups of learners still 
eligible for the scheme’s predecessor (EMA) which could serve as potential 
comparators.10 
Since EMA eligibility was determined on the basis of family income, a potential 
comparison group is pupils from higher-income backgrounds who would not have been 
eligible for EMA even if it had been left unchanged. However, it is well known that pupils 
from higher-income backgrounds generally have higher post-16 participation and 
attainment rates. We therefore compare the change in participation from before and after 
the reform between our treatment and control groups, thus removing the effect of levels. 
A further issue arises when attempting to make comparisons over time between 
education outcomes in 2011/12-2012/13, when the 16 to 19 Bursary Fund was in 
operation, and education outcomes in previous years. In particular, other factors could 
have caused a rise or fall in participation or attainment rates over this period; examples 
might be the broader economic environment, the characteristics of young people, the 
10 Pupils in Year 14 in 2011/12 were still eligible for EMA. However, such pupils would have been a poor comparator because of 
their age difference (compared with pupils in Year 12 and Year 13) and because there are few of them, thereby preventing 
precise statistical analysis. An alternative approach might be to use Scotland or Wales as a control group, as the EMA was 
preserved in its original form there. However data constraints (the National Pupil Database does not include pupils in these areas) 
mean that this is not possible to do in a robust way.  
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state of the youth labour market or reforms to the higher education finance regime.11 To 
the extent that these factors differentially affect the treatment and control groups, it is 
necessary to strip out these factors in order to be confident that any changes in 
participation and attainment only reflect the introduction of the 16 to 19 Bursary Fund. 
In an attempt to circumvent this issue, the empirical analysis in this report compares the 
trends over time in participation and attainment outcomes for lower-income pupils against 
the trends over time in the same outcomes for higher-income pupils. Specifically, the 
analysis tracks successive cohorts of young people and examines the change in lower-
income pupils’ outcomes after the reform; this is then compared against the change in 
higher-income pupils’ outcomes after the reform. The difference between these two 
changes is then estimated as the impact of the policy reform; as a result, this 
methodology is referred to as a ‘difference-in-difference’ (DiD) approach.12  
Figure 2.1.1 illustrates the DiD approach schematically. The crucial assumption that 
underpins the DiD approach is that of common underlying trends after the policy reform: 
while the levels of outcomes are different, the trends in outcomes between different 
groups follow a parallel trajectory and would have continued to follow a parallel trajectory 
had there been no policy reform. In other words, the assumption is that there is no 
convergence or divergence between the education outcomes of the affected and 
comparison groups; if the assumption holds, then any convergence or divergence that 
takes place after the policy reform occurs can be attributed to the policy reform itself. 
  
11 The cohort in Year 13 in 2011/12 would have been the first cohort to face the new higher education finance regime, involving 
maximum tuition fees of £9,000 per year. 
12 This approach has been used before to evaluate the quantitative impact of education programmes and reforms. See, for 
example, Kendall et al. (2005) and Tanner et al. (2011). 
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Figure 2.11: Illustration of the Difference-in-Difference Approach 
 
The common trends assumption cannot be assessed using data following the policy 
reform because that would involve outcomes that may be affected by it. Instead, the 
validity of this approach is assessed by examining whether the affected and comparison 
groups exhibited common trends in their outcomes before the policy reform. If this is true 
then, while it does not prove conclusively that the two groups’ outcomes would have 
continued to follow parallel trends after the policy reform (had the reform not happened), 
it does provide some confidence in the common trends assumption. 
The empirical analysis used in this report goes a step further and uses a modified version 
of a DiD model to provide greater statistical robustness. As the data sources on which 
the analysis is based cover many time periods, it is possible to estimate a long-run 
underlying linear trend in education outcomes for each income group as well as the 
effects of observed characteristics. To conduct an assessment of whether the common 
trends assumption holds, we remove the underlying trends and the effect of background 
characteristics from the data for each income group and investigate whether the 
remaining trends are parallel. Using this approach we find evidence that the common 
trends assumption holds for our main outcome measures, but not for part-time 
participation or non-academic qualifications. We therefore use this modified DiD 
18 
approach to examine the impact of the reforms on full-time13 participation in Y12 and Y13 
as well as the proportion obtaining L2 and L3 qualifications.14 
Section 2.4 provides graphical evidence on whether the parallel trajectories assumption 
holds for our outcomes for different income groups once we strip out the effects of linear 
trends and changes in background characteristics. The impact analysis will then focus on 
those outcomes for which this appears to hold, since the empirical approach is most valid 
for them. However it is first necessary to describe in more detail the data that is used in 
the empirical analysis and the methods for constructing the different income groups. 
2.2 Data and policy definitions  
This analysis uses National Pupil Database (NPD) records on state school pupils who 
were in Year 11 from 2005/06 to 2011/12. Table 2.2.1 provides a breakdown of the 
number of pupil records analysed, by the academic year (cohort) in which pupils were in 
Year 11. 
Table 2..2.1: Number of pupil records by year  
Year 11 cohort Number of records 
2005/06 591,499 
2006/07 598,949 
2007/08 595,974 
2008/09 577,260 
2009/10 576,180 
2010/11 564,584 
2011/12 542,748 
Total 4,047,194 
 
For each pupil, the following information is available on their demographic and socio-
economic characteristics from the School Census: 
§ Gender; 
§ Ethnicity; 
§ Free School Meals (FSM) eligibility; 
13 Participation indicators come from two sources: the school census and the Individualised Learner Record (ILR) data. If an 
individual is present in the school census and not the ILR, they are classified as participating full time. If they are in the ILR, they 
are classified as being in full time participation if their mode of study indicator in the ILR is set equal to 1 (full-time, full-year) or 2 
(full-time, part-year). The alternatives (modes 3-6) in the ILR are all classified as part-time study. 
14 Technically, this approach of estimating separate trends for each group can be thought of as running a before–after analysis for 
each group and then examining the differences between each affected group’s before–after estimates and the comparison 
group’s before–after estimate. 
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§ English as an Additional Language (EAL) status; 
§ Special Education Needs (SEN) status; 
§ Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) and Income Deprivation Affecting Children 
Index (IDACI) scores.15 
Linked information on each pupil’s average point score at Key Stage 2 (KS2) and total 
capped point score16 at Key Stage 4 (KS4) is also available from within the NPD data.  
Finally, information on each pupil’s post-16 participation and attainment is also linked in. 
Participation records come either from School Census data one (two) years later to 
capture participation in school sixth forms in Year 12 (13),17 or from Individualised 
Learner Record (ILR) data to capture participation in other sixth form and further 
education institutions. Post-16 attainment data is taken from the Level 2/3 indicators data 
provided by the DfE: for each pupil, indicators for whether they achieved the Level 2/3 
threshold by the end of the academic year in which they turned 18 – and if so, whether 
through the academic or vocational route – are linked in. The participation and attainment 
outcomes are recorded for 2005/0618 to 2012/13, which was the latest year available at 
the time of analysis. 
The cohorts who were in Year 11 up to 2008/09 faced the previous EMA regime: these 
are referred to as EMA cohorts. The Year 11 cohort in 2009/10 is the EMA transition 
cohort: such pupils would have faced the EMA regime in Year 12 in 2010/11, but would 
have then faced the transitional arrangements in Year 13 in 2011/12. Finally, the cohorts 
in Year 11 in 2010/11 and 2011/12 are the first bursary cohorts: such pupils will have 
faced the new bursary arrangements in both Year 12 and Year 13. This means that the 
analysis of Year 12 participation outcomes in this report focuses on the two bursary 
cohorts, while the analysis of Year 13 participation and attainment outcomes focuses on 
a combination of one transition cohort and one bursary cohort who have been exposed to 
the bursary for two years.19  
The analysis of common trends and the impact analysis both take into account pupil 
characteristics in order to control for them to the extent that they might influence the 
participation and attainment outcomes of interest. In particular, there may be changes 
over time in the relevant characteristics of different income groups: for example, while 
higher-income pupils tend to have higher prior attainment, it may be that the prior 
attainment of lower-income pupils has caught up over time, thereby narrowing the 
15 For more information on these indices, see http://data.gov.uk/dataset/index-of-multiple-deprivation. 
16 This is GCSE points taking scores from the best 8 exams only.  
17 Individuals are defined as being in Year 12 in the first academic year they are observed in education after Year 11 and in Year 
13 in the second academic year they are observed in education after Year 11. 
18 This is one year after the EMA was implemented nationally. The analysis does not use any data on post-16 outcomes preceding 
this point in order to avoid having any policy changes during the pre-reform window (which could compromise the assessment of 
the trends in outcomes) and to increase the validity of the use of a linear trend. 
19 In the interim report (see Britton et al., 2014), we were able to investigate the transitory Year 13 cohort only.  
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attainment gap. Any analysis would need to take relative changes such as these into 
account to avoid confounding the estimated impacts of the policy reform. The following 
characteristics are controlled for, noting that the analysis is split by gender so that is not 
included as a control: 
§ Ethnicity; 
§ EAL status; 
§ SEN status; 
§ Attainment at KS2 and KS4; 
§ IDACI quintile and IMD quintile.  
2.3 EMA eligibility imputation  
The next step is to construct the different income groups in order to identify pupils who 
would have been affected by the reforms and pupils who were not. However, the data 
used in this analysis do not contain any measures of family income that could be used to 
define whether a pupil would have been eligible on EMA grounds. We therefore have to 
impute EMA eligibility based on a set of the socio-economic characteristics available. 
These are an individual’s FSM status in Year 11, their neighbourhood’s IMD and IDACI 
scores, their postcode’s ‘ACORN’ socio-economic classification20 and the proportion of 
households in the pupil’s neighbourhood that are owner-occupiers (taken from the 2001 
Census). Finally, KS2 attainment is also included as this is known to be well correlated 
with parental income. All of this information is combined into an index which serves as a 
proxy for family income.21  
To map this index to levels of actual family income, it is combined with information on the 
distribution of family income taken from the Family Resources Survey (FRS) for 2003/04 
to 2010/11. In particular, the percentile points for the distribution of gross family income 
among households with at least one child aged 14–16 are used. Each pupil’s percentile 
in the socio-economic index is then mapped to the same percentile in the income 
distribution: for example, if a pupil’s score on the socio-economic index is at the 39th 
percentile of that index, they are given the income corresponding to the 39th percentile of 
the family income distribution according to the FRS. The assumption underpinning this is 
that a pupil’s ranking in the socio-economic index is the same as their ranking in the 
distribution of family income. 
With a level of family income assigned to each pupil, they are then classified to a 
particular level of potential EMA eligibility using the known income thresholds for EMA, 
including for cohorts subject to the transitional or bursary arrangements who might 
20 For more information on the ACORN index, see http://acorn.caci.co.uk/. 
21 This is done using principal components analysis. More information can be found in Appendix B.  
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otherwise have been eligible for EMA. The aim is to identify groups of pupils with different 
levels of exposure to the policy reform in 2011/12 and 2012/13.22 Each income group 
corresponds to a particular level of EMA eligibility, as shown in Table 2.3.1. We define 
those eligible for any form of the grants as Groups 1-3, with Group 1 consisting of 
individuals eligible for the full grant (see Table 2.3.2 later). 
Table 2.31: EMA eligibility  
EMA eligibility 
Gross family 
income (before 
2005/06) 
Gross family 
income (from 
2005/06) 
Full (£30) £19,630 or less £20,817 or less 
Partial (£20) £19,631–£24,030 £20,818–£25,521 
Partial (£10) £24,031–£30,000 £25,522–£30,810 
None £30,001+ £30,811+ 
 
Our control group – henceforth “Group 4” – consists of pupils whose imputed family 
income was slightly too high for them to be potentially eligible for EMA if they stayed in 
education or training. This group serves as main the comparison group in the following 
analysis.23 The income band used for this group was chosen specifically to ensure Group 
4 would be as ‘similar’ as possible to Groups 1–3 in terms of pupil characteristics and 
education outcomes, while also being likely to be ineligible for EMA and therefore likely to 
be unaffected by the 16 to 19 Bursary Fund. Using this tightly-defined comparison group 
(Group 4) in order to measure the impacts of the reform maximises the likely validity of 
the assumptions that are made regarding the linearity of the trend in each income group’s 
outcomes (relative to the comparison group). Section 2.4 uses these group definitions to 
assess the validity of these assumptions.  
An unfortunate consequence of the fact that we do not observe income is that individuals 
will inevitably be inaccurately allocated to groups and hence EMA eligibility. 
Consequently, of those who were truly ineligible for the EMA, we will assign a fraction to 
be eligible, and vice versa. In Appendix B, we test the accuracy of our prediction method 
by comparing our predicted eligibility with actual EMA eligibility using a small subset of 
10,700 individuals who are in both the NPD and the Longitudinal Survey of Young People 
22 The analysis assumes that the EMA eligibility income thresholds would have been held constant in the absence of the policy 
reform. This seems reasonable as the thresholds were unchanged in nominal terms from 2005/06.  
23 As seen in Table 2.3.2, Groups 1 to  4 cover 72% of the individuals in Y12 or Y13 in 2011/12 (this proportion declines over time 
from 81% of individuals in Y12 and Y13 in 2005/06). The Table shows that we estimate 60% of individuals as being eligible for 
some form of EMA. This is only broadly consistent with the 45% take-up figure estimated by the Department for Education, for 
two reasons. First, Group 3 is extended in Table 2.3.2 to £35,000. If it were set to £30,810, we would get only 56.7% of individuals 
being eligible. Second, the 45% is the percentage of those in education rather than of the whole population and participation 
rates are lower amongst the EMA eligible.  
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in England (LSYPE),24 which includes a measure of household income, from which we 
can infer eligibility. We find that of those individuals we assign as ineligible, 34.4% 
actually receive the grant, according to their responses. Of those we assign as eligible, 
75.2% actually receive the grant.  
This result strongly suggests that our overall analysis will underestimate the true effect of 
the policy. This is because if participation were to drop amongst the truly eligible and 
remain constant amongst the truly ineligible, participation will drop in our control group by 
more than it should and will not drop by as much as it should in the treated group.  
It important to treat these findings with caution, however, as the LSYPE income data is 
known to be unreliable, and the subset of individuals who we are able to run the test on is 
a tiny fraction of the overall sample size. We therefore choose not to use these results to 
adjust our estimates based on the misclassification bias. Instead, we take two 
precautions. First, we vary the EMA eligibility threshold to minimise the misclassification, 
finding that extending the income eligibility threshold to £35,000 minimises the 
misclassification in the LSYPE.25 This results in the contraction of our control group 
(Group 4) so that it consists of individuals with household incomes between £35,000 and 
£45,000. 
Second, we provide results with Group 5 – those individuals with the very highest 
incomes (i.e. those with income above £45,000) – as a control variable. Individuals in 
Group 5 should be less susceptible to the misclassification bias, meaning that if 
misclassification is important, the estimated effect of the policy with Group 5 as the 
control group should be larger. Our main headline results do not use this group as the 
control group, however, due to concerns that there are too many systematic differences 
between individuals in this group and individuals eligible for the EMA that we cannot 
control for. Instead, we treat the results with Group 5 as the control as an upper bound 
for our estimates. The five groups described above are summarised in Table 2.3.2.  
  
24 See https://www.education.gov.uk/ilsype/workspaces/public/wiki/Welcome/LSYPE for details on the LSYPE. Although there 
were more than 15,000 individuals in the initial dataset, we are only able to use 10,700 because we need a number of years of 
data on those individuals in order to run the test, and there was some attrition from LSYPE sample.  
25 In practice the results are not sensitive to this research decision. 
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4Table 2.3.2: EMA groups 
Group Notional EMA eligibility 
Gross family 
income (before 
2005/06) 
Gross family 
income (from 
2005/06) 
Proportion in 
each group (in 
Y12 or Y13 in 
2011/12)* 
1 Full (£30) £19,630 or less £20,817 or less 44% 
2 Partial (£20) £19,631–£24,030 £20,818–£25,521 5% 
3 Partial (£10) £24,031–£35,000 £25,522–£35,000 11% 
4 Control Group £35,001–£45,000 £35,001–£45,000 12% 
5 Rich Group £45,001+ £45,001+ 28% 
 *The proportion in each group changes with income in each year as eligibility thresholds did not move in line 
with wages.  
2.4 Appropriateness of estimation strategy  
As stated above, the DiD approach is valid under the assumption of common trends 
across groups. We assess this assumption graphically in this section by investigating the 
pre-reform years of 2005/06-2010/11. For each outcome of interest, a graph is 
constructed by taking the mean participation/attainment rate across the six pre-reform 
years for each group and adding to that the residuals from a regression of 
participation/attainment on a linear trend (which is allowed to vary by group) and 
background characteristics. This is of interest because we are interested in common 
trends once these underlying trends and background characteristics have been allowed 
for.  
Figure 2.4.1 shows Year 12 full-time participation of males for Groups 1 to 5, after 
controlling for the characteristics described above and stripping out linear trends. Under 
the common trends assumption these lines would be parallel, maintaining the same 
difference with the comparison group over time. We see that all groups, even Group 5, 
appear to move in parallel over the entire period.26 Group 4 – our main control group – 
appears to follow common trends with all of our groups of interest. Figure 2.4.2 shows 
the equivalent for females. Again the common trends assumption appears to hold.  
Figures 2.4.3 and 2.4.4 look at Year 13 participation of males and females respectively. 
Figures 2.4.5 and 2.4.6 look at Level 2 attainment through either academic or vocational 
routes, while Figures 2.4.7 and 2.4.8 look at Level 3 attainment, again for males and 
females respectively. In all cases there appears to be good evidence of the common 
trends assumption holding.  
26 We also repeated the analysis using quadratic trends, but these were rarely significant and did not perform as well as simple 
linear trends. 
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In all of the participation graphs, there is a jump in 2009/10. This is likely to be due to the 
increase in participation observed after the recession.27 The jump is significant enough to 
not be picked up by the underlying trends. It does not represent a concern for our 
analysis, as it appears to be common for all groups. This pattern does not appear to hold 
for attainment, suggesting that participation temporarily increased after the recession, but 
that those individuals did not acquire any additional qualifications as a result. Indeed the 
attainment results appear to be less variable each year, suggesting they are following a 
steady underlying trend and are not as susceptible to economic conditions.  
Figure 2.4.1: Pre-reform common trends in male full-time Y12 participation 
 
Figure consists of the mean Y12 participation rate for each group in the 6 pre-reform years added to the residuals from 
a regression of a Y12 participation dummy on a set of background characteristics and a linear trend for that group.  
  
27 See http://www.cesi.org.uk/sites/default/files/event_downloads/ACEVO_report.pdf  
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3Figure 2.4.2: Pre-reform common trends in female full-time Y12 participation 
 
Figure consists of the mean Y12 participation rate for each group in the 6 pre-reform years added to the residuals from 
a regression of a Y12 participation dummy on a set of background characteristics and a linear trend for that group.  
Figure 2.4.3: Pre-reform common trends in male full-time Y13 participation 
 
Figure consists of the mean Y13 participation rate for each group in the 6 pre-reform years added to the residuals from 
a regression of a Y13 participation dummy on a set of background characteristics and a linear trend for that group.  
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5Figure 2.4.4: Pre-reform common trends in female full-time Y13 participation 
 
Figure consists of the mean Y13 participation rate for each group in the 6 pre-reform years added to the residuals from 
a regression of a Y13 participation dummy on a set of background characteristics and a linear trend for that group.  
6Figure 2.4.5: Pre-reform common trends in male Level 2 attainment 
 
Figure consists of the mean Level 2 attainment rate for each group in the 6 pre-reform years added to the residuals 
from a regression of a Level 2 attainment dummy on a set of background characteristics and a linear trend for that 
group.  
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7Figure 2.4.6: Pre-reform common trends in female Level 2 attainment 
 
Figure consists of the mean Level 2 attainment rate for each group in the 6 pre-reform years added to the residuals 
from a regression of a Level 2 attainment dummy on a set of background characteristics and a linear trend for that 
group.  
8Figure 2.4.7: Pre-reform common trends in male Level 3 attainment 
 
Figure consists of the mean Level 3 attainment rate for each group in the 6 pre-reform years added to the residuals 
from a regression of a Level 3 attainment dummy on a set of background characteristics and a linear trend for that 
group.  
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9Figure 2.4.8: Pre-reform common trends in female Level 3 attainment 
 
Figure consists of the mean Level 3 attainment rate for each group in the 6 pre-reform years added to the residuals 
from a regression of a Level 3 attainment dummy on a set of background characteristics and a linear trend for that 
group.  
This analysis suggests that the proposed methodology is appropriate in order for us to 
assess the following key outcomes:  
§ Full-time (FT) participation in Year 12; 
§ Full-time (FT) participation in Year 13; 
§ Achievement of the Level 2 (L2) threshold by 18;28 
§ Achievement of the Level 3 (L3) threshold by 18. 
In addition to these key outcomes, part-time education participation in Year 12 and Year 
13, and specifically non-academic Level 2 and Level 3 attainment, are also of interest.29 
However, as seen in figures 2.4.9, 2.4.10, 2.4.11 and 2.4.12, the argument that the 
common trends assumption holds for each of these cases is weak. The graphs for males 
are presented, though the graphs for females are similar (they are available from the 
authors on request). Unfortunately these figures suggest that we could not be confident 
28 Each individual in the dataset (excluding the 2012/13 Year 12 cohort, who are excluded from the attainment analysis as they 
are not observed up to age 18) has a dummy variable set equal to one if they have achieved Level 2 by age 18 and zero if not. 
That includes individuals not in any form of education or in part-time education. The same applies for Level 3 attainment.  
29 The effect on part-time participation is ambiguous: it may decrease due to the reduced financial incentives, or it may increase if 
individuals substitute into part-time study in order to work at the same time to finance their studies. Meanwhile, non-academic 
qualifications are of interest because one might expect the effect to be stronger for this group than for individuals with academic 
qualifications. Individuals partaking in non-academic qualifications may be closer to the margin of accepting work in the first 
place. They are also likely to be lower income and therefore potentially more responsive to changes in financial incentives.  
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about the validity of our results if we were to use the DiD strategy to analyse these 
outcomes.  
10Figure 2.4.9: Pre-reform common trends in male part-time Y12 participation 
 
Figure consists of the mean Y12 PT participation rate for each group in the 6 pre-reform years added to the residuals 
from a regression of a Y12 PT participation dummy on a set of background characteristics and a linear trend for that 
group.  
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11Figure 2.4.10: Pre-reform common trends in male part-time Y13 participation 
 
Figure consists of the mean Y13 PT participation rate for each group in the 6 pre-reform years added to the residuals 
from a regression of a Y13 PT participation dummy on a set of background characteristics and a linear trend for that 
group.  
12Figure 2.4.11: Pre-reform common trends in male Level 2 non-academic attainment 
 
Figure consists of the mean Level 2 non-academic attainment rate for each group in the 6 pre-reform years added to 
the residuals from a regression of a Level 2 non-academic attainment dummy on a set of background characteristics 
and a linear trend for that group.  
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13Figure 2.4.12: Pre-reform common trends in male Level 3 non-academic attainment 
 
Figure consists of the mean Level 3 non-academic attainment rate for each group in the 6 pre-reform years added to 
the residuals from a regression of a Level 3 non-academic attainment dummy on a set of background characteristics 
and a linear trend for that group.  
32 
3. Research analysis findings  
This section presents the estimates of the impacts of the 16 to 19 Bursary Fund, based 
on the empirical approach described previously. The impacts are averaged across the 
2011/12 and 2012/13 academic years and are presented in percentage point terms. They 
should be interpreted as the effect on participation or attainment of replacing EMA with 
the 16 to 19 Bursary Fund, not the actual change in outcomes that happened over the 
period. For example, an impact of -0.5 percentage points (ppts) on FT participation 
means that FT participation was 0.5 ppts lower as a result of the reform; in absence of 
the reform to the EMA, participation would have been 0.5 ppts higher on average in 
2011/12 and 2012/13. Following the main headline impacts, subgroup analysis is 
discussed. Finally, the possibility of different impacts in each of the two post-reform years 
is investigated.  
3.1 Headline impact results on participation and attainment  
The headline estimates are presented in Table 3.1.1. These figures show, for each 
outcome, the impact on each EMA eligibility group (1, 2 or 3), the average impact across 
Groups 1–3 and the average impact across the cohort as a whole. We are slightly 
concerned that our comparison group, Group 4, may be contaminated and include 
people who were receiving EMA. As a way of checking this, the table includes the impact 
of the change in policy on Group 5 compared with Group 4. Our hypothesis would be that 
this group should follow a similar trend to Group 4 after the policy reform, and therefore 
should not have differential post-reform effects to Group 4. This does not hold true in any 
of the four cases, however, as we observe significant positive coefficients on the Group 5 
dummy. This suggests we may be underestimating the effects of changes in the policy 
for Groups 1, 2 and 3 using Group 4 as the control, as the use of Group 5 is likely to be 
less affected by the misclassification bias.  
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5Table 3.1.1: Impact on participation and attainment 
 Full Time Y12 
Participation 
FT Year 13 
Participation 
Level 2 
Attainment 
Level 3 
Attainment 
Group 1  -1.562** -2.021** -2.254** -0.445* 
 (0.213) (0.245) (0.142) (0.223) 
Group 2 -1.580** -1.698** -1.457** -0.285 
 (0.315) (0.365) (0.209) (0.336) 
Group 3  -0.937** -0.556* -0.571** 0.333 
 (0.241) (0.284) (0.160) (0.269) 
Group 5 1.040** 0.772** 0.903** 0.741** 
 (0.195) (0.238) (0.132) (0.226) 
Groups 1-3 -1.439** -1.689** -1.831** -0.269 
 (0.197) (0.231) (0.132) (0.216) 
Overall  -0.872** -1.019** -1.105** -0.163 
 (0.119) (0.139) (0.080) (0.130) 
Actual (%) 84.115 70.605 87.248 48.431 
Counterfactual (%) 84.988 71.624 88.352 48.594 
Sample size 4,616,181 4,655,863 4,655,863 4,655,863 
Standard errors are given in the parentheses and are clustered at school level. *Indicates significant at 5%, ** indicates significant 
at 1%.  
 
These results are derived from separate regressions for males and females, presented in 
Tables 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 below. According to our estimates, the reform reduced the Year 
12 FT participation rate of pupils in Group 1 – those who would have been eligible for the 
full EMA award had it been available – by 1.6ppts, and this estimate is statistically 
significant at the 1% level.30 The effect for Group 2 is also 1.6ppts, while the effect for 
Group 3 is about 0.9ppts. These are the groups who would have been eligible for the 
partial EMA. These estimates are statistically significantly different from zero, but not 
from each other (i.e. we would reject the hypothesis that the effects on Group 2 and 
Group 3 are different from each other).31 Consequently the average impact across the 
three groups is estimated at -1.4ppts, which is statistically significant.32  
An important point to consider when looking at the Y12 participation results is the 
positive, statistically significant coefficient on Group 5.33 Were this group to be used 
30 This means that if the analysis were repeated many times with different populations, there would be less than a 1% chance of 
finding an impact of at least this magnitude if the ‘true’ effect were actually zero. 
31 It is also worth noting that allocation to Groups 1, 2 and 3 is also subject to the misclassification error.  
32 Since the data in question cover the full population of state school pupils, the interpretation of a standard error and associated 
confidence interval is more nuanced than it would be in a study involving a sample of students (e.g. from a survey). In this 
analysis there is no immediate sampling error since the data cover the full population of interest. However, the population that is 
observed could be thought of as drawn from a broader set of potential populations over a longer time period; in future years, the 
relevant population may look different. Moreover, even if the full population is observed, the standard errors around the point 
estimates also reflect the presence of an error term in the model. To the extent that it is impossible for these statistical models to 
perfectly fit the data, the impacts they provide are estimated with a certain amount of error. 
33 Given the suggestive evidence of common trends between Groups 4 and 5 presented in Figures 2.4.1 and 2.4.2, this finding is 
unexpected. There are two plausible explanations. First, we could be badly misallocating income, and Group 4 could include a 
number of individuals affected by the reform. This would suggest our estimated impact is conservative, as participation within 
our control group might have been negatively affected by the reform. Second, common trends between Groups 4 and 5 might 
have broken down between 2010/11 and 2011/12 due to a factor that differentially affected Groups 4 and 5. If this factor also 
differentially impacted Groups 1, 2 and 3, this represents a cause for concern. One candidate factor is the increase in University 
tuition fees from £3,000 to £9,000 per year that affected students starting University in 2012 onwards. For this to explain the 
observed effect, students would have to have opted out of education between ages 16 and 18 due to the increased cost of 
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instead of Group 4 as our control group, the magnitudes of the estimates for all groups 
would have increased by 1.0 ppt. This would involve an estimate of closer to -2.4 ppts for 
all three groups.  
For Year 13 FT participation the estimated impact of the policy change (using Group 4 as 
the control group) is stronger and more concentrated on Groups 1 and 2; amongst Group 
1, participation is estimated to have dropped by 2 ppts as a result of the policy change. 
This suggests that the low levels of EMA funding have less of an impact in the second 
year of study. The average impact across Groups 1-3 is -1.7 ppts, while the overall effect 
on the cohort is -1.0 ppts. All of these estimates are statistically significant. Again, the 
coefficient on Group 5 is positive and statistically significant, although it is smaller than 
for the Year 12 results. This suggests that the Year 12 and Year 13 impacts would be 
extremely similar in magnitude, were Group 5 used as the control group rather than 
Group 4.  
It is important to note that we are unable to obtain reliable estimates of the part-time 
participation effect. To the extent that individuals might be substituting full-time 
participation for part-time participation after the policy change, this might reduce the 
overall negative participation effect. However, it is also possible that part-time 
participation decreased after the policy change and we are underestimating the true 
participation effect. This part-time mechanism does not affect the attainment regressions, 
however. 
For attainment, the analysis estimates that among Group 1, the proportion who had 
achieved at least the L2 threshold by 18 fell by 2.3 ppts, with a corresponding fall across 
all groups potentially eligible for EMA of 1.8 ppts. As a result, the overall proportion of the 
cohort achieving the L2 threshold by 18 is estimated to be around 1.1 ppts below the 
counterfactual level, at 88.4%. If Group 5 rather than Group 4 were used as the control 
group, all these estimates would have increased by more than 0.9 ppts, again suggesting 
that the effects we are estimating may be conservative. 
The overall impact on the L3 attainment rate is smaller and, for the most part, statistically 
insignificant.  This suggests that individuals induced into non-participation (either not 
starting courses or dropping out) under the new policy were more likely to have otherwise 
had L2 study aims, rather than to have been the L3 margin. However the effect on Group 
1 is an estimated drop of 0.4 ppts, which is significant at the 5% level. Further, were 
Group 5 used as the control group, our estimated effects would be 0.7 ppts larger, 
suggesting there is some impact at Level 3. It should be noted, though, that this latter 
University. This seems less likely considering the high labour market returns to post-16, pre-University qualifications (e.g see 
Conlon and Patrignani (2010)). Further, for the effect of this to bias the coefficient negatively, it would require participation to be 
more negatively affected in Group 4 than in Groups 1, 2 and 3 by the tuition change. This seems unlikely, suggesting that any bias 
on the estimates caused by the change in tuition fees would be towards zero. Thus in both cases, the positive coefficient on 
Group 5 suggests the effect on participation is being underestimated in this setting. 
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observation appears to be driven almost entirely by girls, as the male Group 5 coefficient 
is effectively zero (see Tables 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 below).  
3.2 Subgroup analysis 
The results in Table 3.1.1 are derived from separate regressions by gender. Splitting the 
main analysis by gender in this way is common in this area, and follows the approach 
used in Dearden et al., 2008. It was considered necessary not only because the 
underlying participation levels for males and females are known to be different, but also 
because it was deemed likely that there might be different underlying trends and different 
effects of other background characteristics. The separate regression results by gender 
are given in Tables 3.2.1 and 3.2.2. In practice, the tables show that the effects are very 
similar for males and for female, in terms of both participation and attainment, suggesting 
the reform had little impact on the gender participation gap (participation is lower 
amongst men). 
6Table 3.2.1: Impact on participation and attainment, males 
 Full Time Y12 
Participation 
FT Year 13 
Participation 
Level 2 
Attainment 
Level 3 
Attainment 
Group 1  -1.557** -2.134** -2.376** -0.497 
 (0.31) (0.36) (0.21) (0.31) 
Group 2 -1.445** -1.510** -1.473** 0.124 
 (0.46) (0.54) (0.31) (0.48) 
Group 3  -0.871* -0.870* -0.578* 0.103 
 (0.35) (0.42) (0.24) (0.38) 
Group 5 1.468** 0.794* 1.170** 0.108 
 (0.29) (0.35) (0.20) (0.32) 
Groups 1-3 -1.410** -1.814** -1.919** -0.313 
 (0.29) (0.34) (0.20) (0.30) 
Overall  -0.857** -1.099** -1.163** -0.190 
 (0.17) (0.21) (0.12) (0.18) 
Actual (%) 82.207 67.731 84.607 43.322 
Counterfactual (%) 83.064 68.830 85.769 43.512 
Sample Size  2,349,739 2,367,316 2,367,316 2,367,316 
Standard errors are given in the parentheses and are clustered at school level. *Indicates significant at 5%, ** indicates significant 
at 1%.  
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7Table 3.2.2: Impact on participation and attainment, females 
 Full Time Y12 
Participation 
FT Year 13 
Participation 
Level 2 
Attainment 
Level 3 
Attainment 
Group 1  -1.567** -1.904** -2.128** -0.391 
 (0.29) (0.33) (0.19) (0.32) 
Group 2 -1.720** -1.892** -1.440** -0.708 
 (0.43) (0.49) (0.28) (0.47) 
Group 3  -1.006** -0.232 -0.563** 0.570 
 (0.33) (0.38) (0.21) (0.38) 
Group 5 0.596* 0.749* 0.626** 1.395** 
 (0.26) (0.32) (0.17) (0.32) 
Groups 1-3 -1.470** -1.559** -1.739** -0.224 
 (0.27) (0.31) (0.18) (0.31) 
Overall  -0.888** -0.937** -1.045** -0.135 
 (0.16) (0.19) (0.11) (0.19) 
Actual (%) 86.093 73.578 89.979 53.715 
Counterfactual (%) 86.982 74.514 91.024 53.850 
Sample Size  2,266,442 2,288,547 2,288,547 2,288,547 
Standard errors are given in the parentheses and are clustered at school level. *Indicates significant at 5%, ** indicates significant 
at 1%.  
 
There are a number of additional sub-populations of interest, such as various ethnic 
groups, on students with statements of Special Educational Needs, students whose first 
language is not English, or on individuals from more deprived backgrounds. In this 
section we investigate these subgroups. Before estimating the effects on participation or 
attainment it is again necessary to investigate the validity of the common trends 
assumption in each case.  
Figure 3.2.1 does this for ‘non-white’ students in isolation. Though this is a very broad 
definition of ethnicity, we observe that the common trends assumption does not hold for 
this group when looking at male Year 12 participation. This observation holds for females 
and for other outcomes of interest.34 For the finer ethnic groups, the lack of common 
trends is even starker. This finding is consistent with the subgroup analysis in the interim 
report (Britton et al., 2014), which found inconsistent effects in terms of both magnitude 
and sign.  
  
34 Figures 3.2.1–3.2.5 are constructed in the same way as the figures presented in Section 2.4. 
37 
                                            
 
14Figure 3.2.1: Pre-reform common trends in male non-white Y12 participation 
 
Figures 3.2.2 - 3.2.5 investigate the common trends assumption for English as Additional 
Language students, students with statements of Special Educational needs, “deprived” 
(where a deprived student is someone in the bottom quintile of the IDACI distribution - 
though a similar result holds using IMD as the deprivation index) and individuals from 
London. In each of these cases there is insufficient evidence that the common trends 
result holds.35 This means that we are unable to obtain robust estimates of the effect of 
the policy on these subgroups.  
  
35 Again, the underlying trends for males in Year 12 are presented, though the conculsions hold for other outcomes of interest 
and for females. Further common trends graphs are available on request from the authors. 
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15Figure 3.2.2: Pre-reform common trends in male EAL students’ Y12 participation 
 
 
16Figure 3.2.3: Pre-reform common trends in male SEN students’ Y12 participation 
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17Figure 3.2.4: Pre-reform common trends in male low IDACI students’ Y12 participation 
 
 
18Figure 3.2.5: Pre-reform common trends in London male students’ Y12 participation 
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3.3 Investigating the post-reform years separately  
We have two years of post-reform data available, from the 2011/12 and 2012/13 
academic years. This allows the possibility of investigating separate post-reform effects. 
It might be the case, for example, that the 16 to 19 Bursary had a different effect in year 
two than in year one on Year 13 participation because 2011/12 was a transition year 
where eligibility was slightly different for Year 13s than it would be in subsequent years. 
Year two is also the first year when a cohort will have been exposed to the Bursary policy 
for both Year 12 and Year 13; there may be some knock-on impacts for later study from 
non-participation in the first non-compulsory year. Alternatively there might be a rebound 
effect as individuals initially take a year out to save money before returning, or attempt to 
find employment and return upon failing to do so. We investigate this by modifying the 
regression specification used in Sections 3.1 and 3.2 by including two separate post-
reform dummies instead of having one pooled post-reform dummy. This is again done 
separately by gender, with the results presented for males in Tables 3.3.1 and for 
females in Table 3.3.2. 
8Table 3.3.1: Male participation and attainment, separate post-reform year dummies 
 Full Time Y12 
Participation 
FT Year 13 
Participation 
Level 2 
Attainment 
Level 3 
Attainment 
Group 1 Y1 -1.176** -2.293** -1.952** -0.760* 
 (0.33) (0.39) (0.22) (0.33) 
Group 1 Y2 -2.207** -1.721** -2.944** 0.079 
 (0.40) (0.45) (0.26) (0.40) 
Group 2 Y1 -0.868 -1.236* -1.107** 0.096 
 (0.50) (0.60) (0.35) (0.54) 
Group 2 Y2 -2.717** -1.277* -1.415** 0.639 
 (0.58) (0.64) (0.36) (0.57) 
Group 3 Y1  -0.755 -1.108* -0.475 -0.205 
 (0.39) (0.47) (0.26) (0.42) 
Group 3 Y2  -1.091* -0.273 -0.535 0.789 
 (0.44) (0.51) (0.28) (0.48) 
Group 5 Y1 1.535** 0.344 0.974** -0.028 
 (0.32) (0.38) (0.21) (0.35) 
Group 5 Y2  1.327** 1.696** 1.632** 0.469 
 (0.37) (0.44) (0.23) (0.41) 
Sample Size 2,349,739 2,367,316 2,367,316 2,367,316 
Standard errors are given in the parentheses and are clustered at school level. *Indicates significantly different from zero at 5%, 
** at 1%. Bold indicates the statistically significantly different effects. 
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9Table 3.3.2: Female participation and attainment, separate post-reform year dummies 
 Full Time Y12 
Participation 
FT Year 13 
Participation 
Level 2 
Attainment 
Level 3 
Attainment 
Group 1 Y1 -1.539** -1.675** -1.759** -0.314 
 (0.31) (0.36) (0.20) (0.35) 
Group 1 Y2 -1.652** -2.244** -2.638** -0.422 
 (0.36) (0.42) (0.23) (0.41) 
Group 2 Y1 -1.626** -1.283* -0.913** -0.072 
 (0.46) (0.55) (0.30) (0.53) 
Group 2 Y2 -1.899** -2.423** -1.686** -1.077 
 (0.54) (0.59) (0.33) (0.58) 
Group 3 Y1  -1.039** -0.132 -0.411 0.685 
 (0.37) (0.42) (0.22) (0.42) 
Group 3 Y2  -1.010* -0.327 -0.647* 0.539 
 (0.41) (0.48) (0.26) (0.48) 
Group 5 Y1 0.627* 0.863* 0.541** 1.524** 
 (0.29) (0.35) (0.18) (0.34) 
Group 5 Y2  0.503 0.599 0.870** 1.277** 
 (0.33) (0.39) (0.20) (0.41) 
Sample Size 2,266,442 2,288,547 2,288,547 2,288,547 
Standard errors are given in the parentheses and are clustered at school level. *Indicates significantly different from zero at 5%, 
** at 1%. Bold indicates the statistically significantly different effects.  
 
There is some evidence of a differential effect across the two years. However, although 
there appears to be a stronger participation effect in the second year in many cases, the 
vast majority of the effects are not statistically significantly different from one another. 
The exceptions (both highlighted in bold in the tables) are Level 2 attainment amongst 
the most deprived groups, for both males and females. In both cases the Level 2 
attainment effect is smaller in the first, transitional year, which suggests the true effect of 
the 16 to 19 Bursary on attainment may be larger than our reported average effects.  
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4. Robustness  
In this section we run three tests of the robustness of our results. In Section 4.1 we run a 
more formal test of the common trends assumption by testing for an effect using 2010/11 
as the placebo treatment year. In Section 4.2, we test the sensitivity of our results to the 
exclusion of data from 2005/06. Finally, we investigate the sensitivity of our results to 
changing the definition of our income groups. In all three cases, the results of these tests 
support our overall findings.  
4.1 DiD analysis on a placebo treatment year  
As discussed previously, for a difference-in-difference analysis to be valid, the common 
trends assumption must hold. In this case, the key identifying assumption is that trends in 
education participation would be the same in Groups 1, 2 and 3 as in Group 4, were it not 
for the policy change, once underlying trends and group composition are taken into 
account. The figures presented in Section 2.4 provide suggestive evidence that this 
assumption does indeed hold. However in this section we investigate the common trends 
assumption more formally by running a placebo difference-in-difference test with 2010/11 
as the treatment year. This means using exactly the same specification as in the main 
results in Section 3, but with 2011/12 and 2012/13 dropped from the analysis, and 
2010/11 treated as the post-reform year. The linear trend is therefore estimated using the 
2005/06–2009/10 period in this case. If the common trends assumption holds, we would 
not expect to get significant estimates in this test. This is because a significant result 
indicates a divergence of the trend. This would be reasonable after the reform – we 
interpret significant differences in this case as the effect of the reform – but not prior to 
the reform, when we assume that the trends are parallel once underlying linear trends 
and the effects of background characteristics are removed.  
The results from this test are presented in Table 4.1.1 for males, and Table 4.1.2 for 
females. The tables show that the coefficients are considerably smaller in magnitude 
than the corresponding effects reported in Tables 3.2.1 and 3.2.2, and that of the 32 
estimated coefficients, only six are significantly different from zero. We feel this is 
sufficient evidence in favour of our assumption of common trends,36 though we 
acknowledge that these results highlight that there is probably additional uncertainty in 
the estimates that is not accounted for in the standard errors (which are constructed on 
the assumption that the common trends assumption holds).  
  
36 Uncertainty in the estimation process means that in expectation, 1 in 20 zero coefficients would be estimated as being 
significantly different from zero. Although six coefficients is perhaps more than one would expect through natural variation, the 
overall results are still favourable to our assumptions. 
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10Table 4.1.1: Effect on participation and attainment with 2010/11 as placebo treatment year, males 
 
 Standard errors are given in the parentheses and are clustered at school level. *Indicates significant at 5%, ** indicates 
significant at 1%. 
 Full Time Y12 
Participation 
FT Year 13 
Participation 
Level 2 
Attainment 
Level 3 
Attainment 
Group 1 -0.631* -0.415 -0.276 -0.622* 
 (0.25) (0.30) (0.20) (0.24) 
Group 2 -0.684 -0.706 -0.262 -0.713 
 (0.42) (0.45) (0.31) (0.37) 
Group 3 -0.325 -0.066 -0.183 -0.173 
 (0.32) (0.36) (0.25) (0.30) 
Group 5 -0.163 0.011 0.184 0.081 
 (0.27) (0.31) (0.22) (0.26) 
Sample Size 1,787,577 1,788,360 1,788,360 1,788,360 
 
11Table 4.1.2: Effect on participation and attainment with 2010/11 as placebo treatment year, 
females 
 Full Time Y12 
Participation 
FT Year 13 
Participation 
Level 2 
Attainment 
Level 3 
Attainment 
Group 1 -0.675** -0.310 -0.379* -0.202 
 (0.23) (0.29) (0.19) (0.26) 
Group 2 -1.104** -0.059 -0.034 0.341 
 (0.39) (0.44) (0.29) (0.39) 
Group 3 -0.596* -0.085 0.094 0.004 
 (0.30) (0.35) (0.23) (0.31) 
Group 5 -0.036 0.136 0.151 0.388 
 (0.25) (0.30) (0.20) (0.27) 
Sample Size 1,726,729 1,731,331 1,731,331 1,731,331 
Standard errors are given in the parentheses and are clustered at school level. *Indicates significant at 5%, ** indicates significant 
at 1%. 
 
An additional check using 2009/10 as the placebo treatment year is found to yield very 
similar results (these results are available from the authors). 
4.2 Exclusion of 2005/06 
In this section we test the robustness of our results to the exclusion of 2005/06 from the 
estimation. Results that are highly sensitive to the removal of years from the analysis 
would not be very reassuring about the assumptions regarding the underlying linear trend 
in participation. Results with male and female effects pooled together are presented in 
Table 4.2.1. The results are generally smaller in magnitude than those in Table 3.1.1, 
though they are not substantively different. This again is favourable for the reliability of 
our overall results.  
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12Table 4.2.1: Overall effect on participation and attainment, 2005/06 excluded 
 Full Time Y12 
Participation 
FT Year 13 
Participation 
Level 2 
Attainment 
Level 3 
Attainment 
Group 1  -1.131** -1.623** -1.973** -0.094 
 (0.23) (0.27) (0.16) (0.24) 
Group 2 -1.311** -1.489** -1.249** -0.160 
 (0.34) (0.40) (0.23) (0.37) 
Group 3  -0.612* -0.437 -0.482** 0.410 
 (0.26) (0.31) (0.18) (0.30) 
Group 5 1.018** 0.825** 0.792** 0.842** 
 (0.21) (0.26) (0.14) (0.25) 
Groups 1-3 -1.048** -1.373** -1.606** 0.000 
 (0.21) (0.25) (0.14) (0.24) 
Overall  -0.635** -0.829** -0.969** 0.000 
 (0.13) (0.15) (0.10) (0.14) 
Actual (%) 84.114 70.603 87.246 48.427 
Counterfactual (%) 84.749 71.432 88.215 48.427 
Sample Size 4,035,779 4,075,221 4,075,221 4,075,221 
Standard errors are given in the parentheses and are clustered at school level. *Indicates significant at 5%, ** indicates significant 
at 1%.  
4.3 Sensitivity to group bandwidths  
In this section we investigate the sensitivity of our results to the income band definitions. 
Previously, Group 3 was defined to include individual with incomes between £25,522 and 
£35,000. Here, the £30,000–£35,000 group is dropped from Group 3 and excluded from 
the analysis altogether. The results are presented in Table 4.3.1, which shows that the 
main results are highly insensitive to this assumption: the estimates are very similar to 
those in Table 3.1.1.  
13Table 4.3.1: Overall effect on participation and attainment, £30k-£35k excluded 
 Full Time Y12 
Participation 
FT Year 13 
Participation 
Level 2 
Attainment 
Level 3 
Attainment 
Group 1  -1.568** -2.015** -2.249** -0.444* 
 (0.21) (0.25) (0.14) (0.22) 
Group 2 -1.588** -1.696** -1.456** -0.290 
 (0.32) (0.37) (0.21) (0.34) 
Group 3  -1.223** -0.516 -0.600** 0.268 
 (0.27) (0.32) (0.19) (0.30) 
Group 5 1.035** 0.768** 0.904** 0.730** 
 (0.20) (0.24) (0.13) (0.23) 
Groups 1-3 -1.522** -1.768** -1.931** -0.327 
 (0.20) (0.23) (0.13) (0.22) 
Overall  -0.899** -1.040** -1.136** -0.192 
 (0.12) (0.14) (0.08) (0.13) 
Actual (%) 84.096 70.584 87.141 48.311 
Counterfactual (%) 84.995 71.624 88.277 48.503 
Sample Size 4,415,717 4,435,289 4,435,289 4,435,289 
Standard errors are given in the parentheses and are clustered at school level. *Indicates significant at 5%, ** indicates significant 
at 1%.  
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5. Cost–benefit analysis  
In this section we assess the costs and benefits of the policy, primarily for the exchequer, 
of replacing the EMA with the 16 to 19 Bursary. The benefits are generally in the short 
run, as the government accrues savings today through the budget reduction. In section 
5.1 the participation and attainment effects estimated in section 3 are used frame those 
short-run savings in terms of savings per student dropping out of education and per 
student attaining a given qualification level. In section 5.2 the long-run costs of the policy 
are assessed through the investigation of the long-run earnings impact for individuals, 
which may imply an effect on economic output, and the subsequent loss to the 
exchequer through reduced tax receipts and increased benefit expenditure.  
5.1 The short-run savings from replacing the EMA with the 16 
to 19 Bursary  
Government savings associated with the policy change are in the short run, through 
expenditure savings, and through the reduced cost of education as fewer people attend. 
In 2010/11, spending on the EMA in England was an estimated £564 million,37 while 
spending on the 16 to 19 Bursary in 2011/12 was £180 million, according to figures 
provided by the Department for Education. Assuming the same amount would have been 
spent on the EMA in 2011/12 had it not been replaced38 this is a saving of £384 million to 
the government (in 2011 prices).  
In addition to this, as seen in Section 3, education participation in Year 12 and Year 13 
dropped as a result of the policy. Since there is a cost associated with educating each 
participating individual, this will result in an additional saving to the government under the 
16 to 19 Bursary. The magnitude of this saving is calculated below. First, Table 5.1.1 
shows the estimated effect on Year 12 and Year 13 participation, as well as the L2 and 
L3 attainment effects. The central estimates are repeated from Table 3.1.1 while the 
upper and lower bounds represent each end of the 95% confidence intervals around 
those estimates. The estimated impacts using Group 5 as the control group are also 
given.  
  
37 See www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN05778.pdf 
38 This seems a reasonable assumption given that EMA grants were not linked to inflation.  
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14Table 5.1.1: Range of percentage point impacts across all EMA-eligible individuals 
 
 
Full Time Y12 
Participation 
FT Year 13 
Participation 
Level 2 
Attainment 
Level 3 
Attainment 
MAIN SPECIFICATION: Group 4 as control  
Upper bound  -1.826 -2.140 -2.089 -0.693 
Central estimate  -1.439 -1.689 -1.831 -0.269 
Lower bound -1.053 -1.237 -1.572 0.154 
ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATION: Group 5 as control  
Upper bound  -3.906 -3.684 -3.894 -2.174 
Central estimate  -2.479 -2.461 -2.733 -1.010 
Lower bound -2.093 -2.009 -2.475 -0.586 
 
 
Second, the change in the number of individuals participating in Year 12 and Year 13 as 
a result of the policy is given in Table 5.1.2, alongside the change in the number of 
individuals achieving L2 and L3 qualifications. The central, main specification estimates 
9,867 fewer individuals participating in Year 12 or Year 13, 5,898 fewer individuals 
achieving L2, and 868 fewer individuals achieving L3. With the alternative specification, 
using Group 5 as the control group, the central estimates are 15,551 fewer individuals 
participating, 8,807 fewer individuals attaining L2, and 3,254 fewer individuals achieving 
L3.  
15Table 5.1.2: Headcount impacts on participation and attainment 
 Full Time Y12 
Participation 
FT Year 13 
Participation 
Level 2 
Attainment 
Level 3 
Attainment 
MAIN SPECIFICATION: Group 4 as control  
Upper bound  -5,614 -6,897 -6,730 -2,213 
Central estimate  -4,425 -5,441 -5,899 -868 
Lower bound -3,237 -3,986 -5,067 497 
ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATION: Group 5 as control  
Upper bound  -12,008 -11,879 -12,547 -7,005 
Central estimate  -7,623 -7,929 -8,807 -3,254 
Lower bound -6,434 -6,473 -7,976 -1,890 
Headcount impacts are the estimated number of individuals not participating, or not achieving L2/L3 qualifications as a result of 
the policy. They are equal to the corresponding EMA-eligible percentage point impact multiplied by the EMA-eligible cohort size. 
Because our headline impacts are the average effect across two years of the policy, we use average EMA-eligible cohort size 
across the two years as the cohort size. 
 
Third, these participation estimates are multiplied by the estimated average cost of 
educating each individual, per year. Our best estimate of this is £4,975 per pupil.39 This 
figure is multiplied by the total participation effect (for Y12 and Y13 combined)40 and 
added to the estimated expenditure savings in Table 5.1.3 to give the total estimated 
savings to the government associated with the policy. 
39 Estimate supplied by DfE based on assumption-based modelling of full-time funding costs. This is the average of their 2011/12 
and 2012/13 estimates (which are themselves very similar).  
40 The cost per pupil is multiplied by 0.965 in the second year to reflect the discounting of the future by 3.5%.  
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16Table 5.1.3: Government savings (£m) 
 Financial Support Cost of Education Provision 
Total 
 
MAIN SPECIFICATION: Group 4 as control  
Upper bound  384 61.0 445.0 
Central estimate  384 48.1 432.1 
Lower bound 384 35.2 419.2 
ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATION: Group 5 as control  
Upper bound  384 116.7 500.7 
Central estimate  384 76.0 460.0 
Lower bound 384 63.1 447.1 
Savings are in £ millions and are reported in 2011 prices. These are the estimated average savings to the government per year 
associated with the 16 to 19 Bursary being in place instead of the EMA.  
 
For our main specification, total government savings associated with having the 16 to 19 
Bursary in place instead of the EMA are therefore estimated to be £432 million per year. 
The upper and lower bounds on this estimate are £445 million and £419 million 
respectively. Under the alternative specification with Group 5 as the control, government 
savings are estimated to be £460 million per year, with a lower bound of £447 million, 
and an upper bound of £501 million. The savings are larger under the alternative 
specification because more people dropped out of education as a result of the policy 
under this scenario.  
It is important to note, however, that part-time figures are excluded from this analysis 
because we do not have a reliable estimate of the part-time participation effect. Since the 
part-time effect is ambiguous – lost financial support might mean fewer participants 
through the same mechanism as the effect on full-time participation, or it might mean 
more participants as people switch to part-time in order to work whilst studying – it is not 
possible to say whether this contributes to us underestimating or overestimating the true 
effect.  
Using the figures given in Tables 5.1.2 and 5.1.3, it is possible to estimate changes in the 
total number of individuals participating and the total number of individuals attaining L2 or 
L3 qualifications per £1 million saved by the government. These estimates are given in 
Table 5.1.4.  
17Table 5.1.4: Headcount impacts per £1m saved 
 Y12 + Y13 
Participation L2 Overall Level 3 Overall 
MAIN SPECIFICATION: Group 4 as control  
Upper bound  -28.1 -15.1 -5.0 
Central estimate  -22.8 -13.6 -2.0 
Lower bound -17.2 -12.1 1.2 
ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATION: Group 5 as control  
Upper bound  -47.7 -25.1 -14.0 
Central estimate  -33.8 -19.1 -7.1 
Lower bound -28.9 -17.8 -4.2 
Using 2011 prices.  
48 
For our main specification, the central impact estimate is of 23 fewer individuals 
participating in education, 14 fewer L2 achievers and 2 fewer L3 achievers per £1 million 
saved. Under the alternative specification, the central estimates are of 34 fewer 
individuals in education, 19 fewer L2 achievers and 7 fewer L3 achievers per £1 million 
saved. These figures do not take into account the long-run costs associated with the 
policy, however. These are investigated in the following section.  
5.2 The long-run costs of replacing the EMA with the 16 to 19 
Bursary 
The analysis in Section 3 indicated a negative impact of switching from the EMA to the 
16 to 19 Bursary on both participation and attainment. In this section we consider how 
the effect on attainment might translate into long-term economic losses for the individual 
and for the government.  
Our methodology closely follows Cattan, Crawford and Dearden (2014). First, we 
estimate the highest education level an individual will achieve by age 21 under the policy 
(the 16 to 19 Bursary) and under the policy counterfactual (keeping the EMA). There are 
four possible education levels: less than Level 2, Level 2 (at least 5 A*-C GCSEs or 
equivalent), Level 3 (at least 2 A Levels or equivalent) and Level 4 (University degree). 
Second, we simulate 10,000 lifetime earnings paths for each highest education 
qualification level and gender. For each path, we also simulate cohabitation and 
childbirth, as well as additional household income. Third, we run the 10,000 simulated 
profiles through the Institute for Fiscal Studies’s model of taxes and benefits (henceforth, 
“TAXBEN”) in each period, taking into account other household income, marital status 
and number of children present, converting gross earnings into net earnings. Fourth, we 
randomly assign an earnings path to every individual in the NPD sample in Year 13 in 
2011/12 or 2012/13. Using this, we report (the discounted present value of) average 
individual lifetime earnings and average individual tax contributions under both policies. 
Because earnings are dependent on the highest education qualification of the individual, 
a negative shift in the highest-education distribution caused by moving from the EMA to 
the 16 to 19 Bursary should therefore translate into lower lifetime earnings on average, 
and lower tax receipts for the exchequer. 
5.2.1 Estimating the highest education qualification  
As outlined above, the first step in the process is to estimate the highest-education 
distribution for individuals under the EMA and under the 16 to 19 Bursary. In practice this 
involves estimating for each individual a probability that they will achieve a certain level 
by age 21, and taking the average probability for each level across all individuals under 
each scenario.  
The probabilities are estimated in two stages. In the first, we replicate the approach used 
in Section 3 and use a difference-in-difference approach to estimate regression models 
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looking at the effect of moving from the EMA to the Bursary on Level 2 and Level 3 
attainment separately. For the cohort of individuals who would have been in Year 13 in 
2012/13, we use these models to predict the probability of the individual achieving Level 
2 or Level 3 by age 18 under both policy scenarios. The residual is the probability of 
achieving Level 1.41  
In the second stage, we use the LSYPE to estimate the probability of individuals 
achieving a particular level at 21, given their education level at 18.42 We do this by 
merging the LSYPE to the NPD so that we have individuals’ qualifications at age 18 (from 
the NPD) and at age 21 (from the LSYPE). We then take the probability of an individual 
transitioning from a given level at 18 to any other at 21 as equal to the proportion of 
individuals in the LSYPE sample who made that transition. We fragment the sample by 
FSM eligibility, gender and ethnicity (white versus non-white) so that the transition 
probabilities vary across these groups. We then multiply the probability of an individual 
achieving a given level by 18 by the transition probability and sum across all possible 
routes to get the final probability. So, for example the probability of an individual 
achieving Level 4 by 21 is equal to:  
𝑃𝑃(𝐿𝐿421) =  𝑃𝑃(𝐿𝐿118) ∗ 𝑃𝑃(𝐿𝐿421|𝐿𝐿118) +  𝑃𝑃(𝐿𝐿218) ∗ 𝑃𝑃(𝐿𝐿421|𝐿𝐿218) +  𝑃𝑃(𝐿𝐿318) ∗ 𝑃𝑃(𝐿𝐿421|𝐿𝐿318)   
The average of these probabilities across all individuals for each level gives us our 
highest-education distributions. These are shown under both the EMA and the 16 to 19 
Bursary in Table 5.2.1. The education distributions are shifted to the left under the 16 to 
19 Bursary compared to the EMA, in that a higher proportion are at Level 1, and a lower 
proportion are at all of the other three levels. This is true both for boys and for girls, 
although girls on average achieve better qualifications than boys under both scenarios.  
We estimate the distribution both with Group 4 as a control group (as in the main 
specification regressions) and with Group 5 as a control group, which we treat as an 
upper bound on our estimates. With Group 5 the pattern in the differences between the 
policies remains the same, though the difference is now more pronounced. This aligns 
with the regression results in Section 3, where we observed a significant positive 
coefficient on the Group 5 dummy in the Level 2 regressions. The estimates in Table 
5.2.1 all suggest that moving from the EMA to the 16 to 19 Bursary would be associated 
with a small drop in the proportion of individuals attaining Level 3 and Level 4 
qualifications by age 21. However, the biggest changes are at the Level 1/Level 2 
threshold, which again aligns with our previous findings.  
41 This approach is simply an alternative way of estimating the model used in Section 3, the main results, and the results are 
exactly equivalent: it is simply a way of using the analysis to get a probability distribution of attaining different education 
qualifications for each individual under both policies.  
42 This assumes the relationship between qualifications by 18 and qualifications at age 21 is not affected by the policy. This 
appears to be the safest assumption in this context.  
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18Table 5.2.1: Estimated highest-education distribution by age 21 under the 16 to 19 Bursary and 
under the EMA for individuals in Groups 1-3 
 (A)  
EMA 
(B)  
16 to 19 
Bursary 
(C)  
Difference 
between  
(A) and (B) 
MAIN SPECIFICATION: GROUP 4 AS THE CONTROL GROUP  
 
Probability for males of attaining each final educational level  
Level 1 (< 5 GCSEs A*–C or equivalent) 0.155 0.174 0.019 
Level 2 (5 GCSEs A*–C or equivalent) 0.316 0.306 -0.011 
Level 3 (A levels) 0.197 0.193 -0.004 
Level 4 (University degree) 0.331 0.327 -0.004 
Probability for females of attaining each final educational level  
Level 1  0.098 0.116 0.017 
Level 2  0.286 0.276 -0.010 
Level 3  0.211 0.208 -0.003 
Level 4  0.405 0.401 -0.004 
    ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATION: GROUP 5 AS THE CONTROL GROUP  
 
Probability for males of attaining each final educational level  
Level 1  0.145 0.175 0.030 
Level 2  0.326 0.308 -0.018 
Level 3  0.194 0.188 -0.005 
Level 4  0.334 0.328 -0.006 
Probability for females of attaining each final educational level  
Level 1  0.093 0.116 0.023 
Level 2  0.282 0.277 -0.005 
Level 3  0.210 0.205 -0.006 
Level 4  0.415 0.402 -0.013 
Individuals in Groups 1, 2 and 3 would have been eligible for EMA had it not been abolished.  
 
5.2.2 Simulating lifetime earnings  
To estimate the long-run impact of the policy on individuals’ lifetime earnings and on the 
exchequer, we use a model of employment and earnings to simulate lifetime earnings of 
the individual. The model uses a combination of the British Household Panel Survey 
(BHPS) and the Labour Force Survey (LFS) to estimate the dynamics of earnings and 
the probability of employment and unemployment. This model has been used by 
researchers at the Institute for Fiscal Studies in a number of contexts, including the 
analysis of Higher Education finance (Crawford and Jin, 2014) and of a pre-school 
education intervention (Cattan, Crawford and Dearden, 2014). It is described in full detail 
in Appendix A.3.  
In the model, earnings and employment through the life cycle are dependent on the 
highest education qualification (Level 1, 2, 3 or 4) and gender of the individual. 
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Individuals in Levels 1-3 start earning at age 19, whilst individuals with Level 4 start 
earning at age 22. All individuals can work until age 60.43 In general, the earnings 
trajectories are steeper and reach a higher level for higher-educated individuals, and are 
higher on average for males than for females.  
In Table 5.2.2 we present the discounted present value (DPV) of lifetime earnings under 
the EMA, and under the 16 to 19 Bursary. This value is averaged across all individuals in 
Groups 1-3 (i.e. individuals who would have been eligible for the EMA) and across all 
education groups. We follow the Green Book44 and set the discount rate at 3.5% for the 
first 30 years, and at 3% for the next 25 years. Although earnings do not begin until age 
19 at the earliest in the model, we start discounting from age 16, as this is the age at 
which the government would have to make the funding available for the EMA.  
We model earnings at both the individual and the household level. The latter requires us 
to include in the model a probability (conditional on age and education) that an individual 
will become married, and a probability that an individual will have a child (conditional on 
age, education and marital status) in each period. These probabilities are taken from the 
BHPS. Our estimated net present value of earnings at the household level thus includes 
all net earnings of the household of the individual over the life cycle; i.e. there is no 
division of household income between spouses. For this reason the DPV of lifetime 
earnings is larger at the household level than at the individual level in Table 5.2.2.  
The advantages of modelling at the household level are twofold. First, it incorporates the 
fact that changes to individuals’ education may influence their marital and fertility 
decisions into the model. Second, it improves our estimate of exchequer returns (see 
Section 5.2.3), as the tax and benefit system is in practice highly dependent on family 
situation. In our calculations below, we allow for the fact that two individuals from the 
same household may both be affected by the policy.  
Finally, as in the previous section, we repeat the analysis using Group 5 as the control 
group rather than Group 4. As seen in Table 5.2.2, with Group 4 as the control group the 
loss in DPV of lifetime earnings associated with moving from the EMA to the 16 to 19 
Bursary is £4,097 when estimated at the individual level and £6,735 when estimated at 
the household level. Using Group 5 as the control group, the equivalent figures are 
£7,042 and £11,330. These larger figures are a consequence of the larger shift in the 
education distribution associated with the policy change when Group 5 is used as the 
control group.  
43 This will potentially produce conservative impacts for this cohort, although earnings at this point are heavily discounted, thus 
muting the impact of this somewhat.  
44 HM Treasury (2011), The Green Book: Appraisal and Evaluation in Central Government 
(https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-green-book-appraisal-and-evaluation-in-central-governent). 
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19Table 5.2.2: Estimated average discounted present value (DPV) of gross lifetime earnings under 
the 16 to 19 Bursary and under the EMA for individuals in Groups 1-3 
 (A)  
EMA 
(B)  
16 to 19 
Bursary 
(C)  
Difference 
between  
(A) and (B) 
MAIN SPECIFICATION: GROUP 4 AS THE CONTROL GROUP  
 
Discounted present value of gross lifetime earnings at the individual level 
Individual-level average DPV of lifetime 
earnings (£) 
£638,463 £634,367 -£4,097 
(1,540) (1,556) (509.8) 
Discounted present value of gross lifetime earnings at the household level  
Household-level average DPV of lifetime 
earnings (£) 
£1,391,497 £1,384,761 -£6,735 
(1,548) (1,372) (721.9) 
    ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATION: GROUP 5 AS THE CONTROL GROUP  
 
Discounted present value of gross lifetime earnings at the individual level  
Individual-level average DPV of lifetime 
earnings (£) 
£641,204 £634,162 -£7,042 
(1,610) (1,556) (401.4) 
Discounted present value of gross lifetime earnings at the household level  
Household-level average DPV of lifetime 
earnings (£) 
£1,395,815 £1,384,485 -£11,330 
(1,493) (1,374) (565.1) 
Individuals in Groups 1, 2 and 3 would have been eligible for EMA had it not been abolished. Figures in the parentheses are bootstrapped 
standard errors, from 1000 repetitions. Figures are in September 2014 prices.  
 
5.2.3 Estimating the exchequer’s tax receipts  
In this section we calculate the NPV of average tax receipts per individual in Groups 1-3 
accrued by the exchequer under the EMA and under the 16 to 19 Bursary. This exercise 
is essential for calculating the costs and benefits associated with the policy. We do this 
by running the earnings profiles estimated for each individual through TAXBEN, a model 
of the 2012/13 UK tax and benefit system.45 In our individual-level model, we assume 
that the individual never marries or has children, and lives on his/her own throughout the 
lifecycle. In the household-level model we allow individuals to marry and to have children, 
as described in the previous section. We again estimate the average NPV of lifetime tax 
receipts using both Group 4 and Group 5 as the control group separately.  
Table 5.2.3 shows that at the individual level, with Group 4 as the control group, the 
average tax receipts per individual are £1,334 lower under the 16 to 19 Bursary than 
under the EMA. At the household level this figure is £2,762. When Group 5 is used as the 
control group these figures are increased to £2,367 and £4,857 per individual 
respectively.  
45 We assume that the tax and benefit system stays unchanged (in real terms) through the lifecycle. While this is clearly 
unrealistic, attempting to predict future changes to the system would be of limited value.  
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20Table 5.2.3: Estimated discounted present value (DPV) of exchequer receipts under the 16 to 19 
Bursary and under the EMA for those in Groups 1-3 
 (A)  
EMA 
(B)  
16 to 19 
Bursary 
(C)  
Difference 
between  
(A) and (B) 
MAIN SPECIFICATION: GROUP 4 AS THE CONTROL GROUP  
 
Discounted present value of exchequer receipts at the individual level 
Average DPV of exchequer receipts per 
individual in £ 
£279,325 £277,991 -£1,334 
(645.6) (610.4) (212.2) 
Discounted present value of exchequer receipts at the household level  
Average DPV of exchequer receipts per 
individual in £ 
£696,226 £693,464 -£2,762 
(859.7) (789.18) (351.1) 
    ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATION: GROUP 5 AS THE CONTROL GROUP  
 
Discounted present value of exchequer receipts at the individual level  
Average DPV of exchequer receipts per 
individual in £ 
£280,270 £277,903 -£2,367 
(630.5) (610.4) (167.3) 
Discounted present value of exchequer receipts at the household level  
Average DPV of exchequer receipts per 
individual in £ 
£698,175 £693,319 -£4,857 
(841.2) (789.7) (276.7) 
Individuals in Groups 1, 2 and 3 would have been eligible for EMA had it not been abolished. Figures in the parentheses are bootstrapped 
standard errors, from 1000 repetitions. Figures are in September 2014 prices.  
 
5.3 Summarising the costs and benefits  
The loss in DPV of lifetime tax receipts associated with moving from the EMA to the 16 to 
19 Bursary should be compared to the savings associated with the policy. As seen in 
Table 5.1.3, the estimated total annual savings associated with the move were £432 
million, in 2011 prices. This is £459 million in September 2014 prices, which we use for 
the comparison with the costs. The total costs equal the loss to the exchequer per 
individual multiplied by the number of affected individuals, of which there are 322,237.46  
The savings and costs are summarised in Table 5.3.1. We again produce results from 
calculations at both the individual and the household level. To calculate the population-
level long-run costs for the individual level, we simply multiply the average individual 
effect by the number of EMA-eligible individuals in the cohort. This approach is 
inappropriate when looking at the household level, however, as if two affected individuals 
were to cohabit, that household would be counted twice. To avoid this, we have to make 
an assumption about the proportion of individuals who cohabit with other individuals 
46 This is the average number of individuals in Year 13 across 2011/12 and 2012/13. This figure is appropriate because the 
assessment of the costs involves looking at Level 2 and Level 3 attainment by the end of Year 13. It is appropriate to use the 
average of the two cohort sizes because we pool the post-reform years to get an average effect across the two years in the 
analysis.  
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affected by the policy. In our model, individuals spend 64% of the time married or 
cohabiting. Assuming all cohabitations are between individuals affected by the policy,47 
the average household-level cost should be multiplied by 0.61.48 Calculations in Table 
5.3.1 use this scaling factor. 
21Table 5.3.1: Estimated overall exchequer costs and benefits of the policy (£m) 
  Savings (£m) Costs (£m) Savings – 
Costs (£m) 
 
MAIN SPECIFICATION: GROUP 4 AS THE CONTROL GROUP  
Individual Level £458.9 £429.9 £29.1 
Household Level £458.9 £542.6 -£83.7 
ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATION: GROUP 5 AS THE CONTROL GROUP  
Individual Level £488.5 £762.8 -£274.2 
Household Level £488.5 £954.3 -£465.8 
Using central estimates of savings. All figures are in September 2014 prices.  
 
Using Group 4 as the control group, the individual-level simulations result in an estimated 
saving to the government of approximately £29 million. However, our best estimate is to 
consider the household-level calculations, which result in a loss of approximately £84 
million, in September 2014 prices. This means that the discounted present value of lost 
tax receipts under the 16 to 19 Bursary caused by reduced lifetime earnings exceeds the 
short-run savings associated with the policy. When Group 5 is used as the control group, 
we estimate a loss to the exchequer of £274 million at the individual level and £466 
million at the household level. This highlights the sensitivity of the results to a small 
change in the estimated impact on attainment, and suggests that the underestimation of 
the effect due to misclassification error is likely to lead to a large underestimation of the 
true long-run costs to the government.  
As discussed above, omitting the analysis of part-time participation does affect the 
benefits side of our calculation. However it does not affect the costs, as our analysis of 
the costs is driven entirely by the attainment regression results, for which part-time 
individuals are included. This means that the scope for part-time participation to affect the 
overall conclusions of the cost–benefit analysis is limited.  
47 This is a conservative assumption, as one would expect at least some of the cohabiting to be with individuals unaffected by the 
policy. 
48 If 100% were cohabiting 100% of the time, we should multiply the average household level cost by 1/(1+1) = 0.5. If individuals 
are cohabiting 64% of the time, we should multiply the average household level cost by 1/(1+0.64) = 0.61.  
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6. Conclusion 
The analysis in this report uses statistical techniques to provide estimates of the impact 
of replacing EMA with the 16 to 19 Bursary Fund. The headline impacts indicate that the 
reform led to an average 1.6 ppt fall across the 2011/12-2012/13 academic years in FT 
participation amongst Year 12 students who would otherwise have been eligible for the 
full EMA award. The effect on those eligible for a partial EMA are smaller, resulting in an 
estimated overall effect on those eligible for any form of EMA of -1.4 ppts, or -0.9 ppts 
across the whole cohort. For Year 13 participation, there was an average 2.0 ppt fall in 
FT participation among the poorest students who would have previously been eligible for 
the full EMA. Overall, there was a statistically significant fall in FT participation of 1.7 ppts 
across all EMA-eligible Year 13 pupils and 1.0 ppts across the whole cohort. 
 
The findings for attainment suggest that the impacts were the most negative among the 
poorest students: among those who would have been eligible for the full EMA award, 
there was a 2.3 ppts fall in the L2 achievement rate, leading to a 1.1 ppts fall across the 
whole Year 13 cohort. This is a perhaps surprising finding as the intention of the Bursary 
was to more effectively target those most in need of the award. The effects on L3 
attainment were considerably smaller, and with the exception of the group who would 
have been eligible for the full grant, insignificantly different from zero. There was no 
evidence of a strong differential effect for girls and for boys, and no clear evidence of 
differing effects by other sub-groups.  
 
Importantly, it is likely that the overall impact estimates presented in this report 
underestimate the true impacts of the policy reform in question. Nevertheless, our cost–
benefit analysis estimates that the long-run costs from the policy because of reduced tax 
receipts outweigh the short-run savings from expenditure cuts, and that is without taking 
into account wider impacts including the effects on productivity, crime or health.  
Of course, the analysis does not account for the economic benefits that accrue from 
alternative investments of the short-run savings. Those alternatives should be examined 
with a similar approach to that used here in order to assess their relative cost-
effectiveness.  
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Appendix A: Econometric methodology 
A.1 Regression specifications 
A.1.1 Main results 
The statistical models used in this analysis are all least squares regression models (since 
the outcome indicators are all binary, they are also linear probability models). The 
estimating equation for the headline impact analysis is as follows: 
  𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝑣𝑣𝑠𝑠 + 𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑔𝑔𝐷𝐷𝑔𝑔 + 𝜆𝜆𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑔𝑔�𝐷𝐷𝑔𝑔 ∙ 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖� + 𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂 + 𝜃𝜃𝑔𝑔�𝐷𝐷𝑔𝑔 ∙ 𝜂𝜂� + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(1)  
   
• 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the participation or attainment outcome for pupil 𝑖𝑖 at time 𝜂𝜂; 
• 𝛼𝛼 is an intercept; 
• 𝜈𝜈𝑠𝑠 is the school fixed effect;  
• 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the set of characteristics for pupil 𝑖𝑖 at time 𝜂𝜂 controlled for in the model. 
These are gender, ethnicity, SEN status, EAL status, IDACI quintile, IMD quintile, 
KS2 average point score (entered linearly), KS4 capped point score (entered 
linearly), a dummy for whether the individual had achieved Level 2 by age 16 and 
the neighbourhood proportion of residents with a Level 4/5 qualification, obtained 
from the 2001 Census (entered linearly); 
• 𝐷𝐷𝑔𝑔 is a set of income group indicators (the comparison group, Group 4, being the 
omitted category); 
• 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 is an indicator for the post-reform period, i.e. 2011/12-2012/13; 
• 𝐷𝐷𝑔𝑔 ∙ 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 is an interaction term which identifies the outcomes observed among Group 
𝑔𝑔 in the post-reform period 2011/12-2012/13. The coefficients on this interaction 
term, 𝛿𝛿𝑔𝑔, are the impact estimates; 
• 𝜂𝜂 is an aggregate linear trend in the outcome (effectively the trend for the 
comparison group); 
• 𝐷𝐷𝑔𝑔 ∙ 𝜂𝜂 is a separate linear trend for Group 𝑔𝑔; 
• 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is an error term representing all other unmeasured influences on 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 for pupil 𝑖𝑖 
at time 𝜂𝜂. 
 
For the gender-specific regressions, the above specification is used for each gender 
separately, with the gender dummy variable omitted from the right-hand side. In all the 
models, the standard errors are clustered at the school (in Year 11) level. This assumes 
that 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is independent across schools, but can be correlated across different pupils in the 
same school, and can also be correlated over time within the same school. 
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A.1.2 Investigating the post-reform years separately  
In Section 3.3 we investigate the effects of the post-reform years separately. The 
specification used is as follows:  
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝑣𝑣𝑠𝑠 + 𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑔𝑔𝐷𝐷𝑔𝑔 + ��𝜆𝜆𝑗𝑗𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 + 𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗𝑔𝑔�𝐷𝐷𝑔𝑔 ∙ 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 ��2
𝑗𝑗=1
+ 𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂 + 𝜃𝜃𝑔𝑔�𝐷𝐷𝑔𝑔 ∙ 𝜂𝜂� + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖        (2) 
This is exactly as in (1), but there are now two post-reform dummies, 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖1 and 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖2, and the 
coefficients 𝛿𝛿1𝑔𝑔 and 𝛿𝛿2𝑔𝑔 are the coefficients of interest.  
A.1.3 Difference-in-difference placebo tests  
In section 4.1, as a test of our common trends assumption, we investigate using a pre-
treatment year as the placebo year. For this, the specification is exactly as in (1), except 
that 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 is now a dummy variable set equal to one for 2010/11. The 2011/12-2012/13 data 
is not used in these regressions.  
A.2 Bootstrapped standard errors  
A potential area of concern is the fact that an individual’s income group is only estimated 
in our process as we do not directly observe income. The standard errors from the main 
specification regressions assume that individuals are accurately allocated to income 
groups and therefore do not incorporate this additional degree of uncertainty. We 
investigate the validity of the standard errors (which will affect the statistical significance 
of our findings) by recalculating them using a bootstrap technique. It is important to note 
that this does not deal with the misclassification bias, but instead should in theory 
incorporate the additional uncertainty into the standard errors.  
The technique involves taking a subset of all individuals included in the estimation and 
re-estimating the entire model on that subset alone. This process includes the re-
estimation of an individual’s income group using their percentile rank in the socio-
economic status (SES) distribution created using principal components analysis. Note 
that an individual may be allocated to two different income groups in consecutive 
iterations of the bootstrap despite having identical characteristics, purely due to a change 
in the composition of the subsample for the principal components analysis, which is used 
to allocate individuals an income (and hence income group). The impact regressions are 
each re-estimated with each repetition, with variation across subsamples creating 
variation in the regression coefficients. The standard errors are then equal to the 
standard deviations of these regression coefficients.  
This process is found to make extremely little difference to our results. Due to the fact 
that the process is so highly computationally burdensome, bootstrapped standard errors 
are not reported in the tables given in this report (Tables 5.2.2 and 5.2.3 excepted).  
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A.3 Earnings and employment dynamics model  
A.3.1 Earnings model  
The model for log earnings (𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) for individual 𝑖𝑖 at age 𝑎𝑎 in year 𝜂𝜂 is: 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑦𝑦�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   
𝑦𝑦�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  + 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  = 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝜃𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1,𝑖𝑖−1 
𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  = 𝜌𝜌𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1,𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖0𝑖𝑖  = 0 
𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖0𝑖𝑖  = 0 
where 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a vector of observable characteristics for individual 𝑖𝑖 that includes a quartic 
polynomial in age, a full set of year dummies, and dummies for region and ethnicity. 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 is 
an individual-specific fixed effect and 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 is an individual-specific deterministic linear trend 
in age. Together, 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 and 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 allow for cross-sectional heterogeneity in both the level and 
age-profile of the deterministic component of earnings. The idiosyncratic stochastic 
component comprises two parts: 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a first-order autoregressive persistent shock and 
𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a first-order moving-average transitory shock. We allow the variances of both 
shocks, 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 and 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, to be quadratic functions of age and we allow the autoregressive 
parameter, 𝜌𝜌, to be a cubic function of age. The moving-average parameter, 𝜃𝜃, is 
assumed to be fixed across ages.  
The model parameters are estimated separately for male and for female graduates using 
the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). Estimation takes place in three stages:  
1. Regress log earnings on the observed characteristics 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 and store the residuals as 
𝑦𝑦�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. 
2. Calculate the sample auto-covariance function of the residuals 𝑦𝑦�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 at each age for up 
to 10 lags. This generates a set of estimated auto-covariances, 𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑣𝑣(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖, 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖−𝑑𝑑) for 
𝑑𝑑 = 0, … ,10. 
3. Choose the parameters of the earnings model to minimise the distance between the 
sample auto-covariance function and the theoretical auto-covariance function implied 
by the model. Each element of the auto-covariance function is weighted by 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑0.5 , 
where  𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑0.5  is the number of observations that were used in the construction of the 
sample auto-covariance at age 𝑎𝑎 and lag 𝑑𝑑.  
In total, 374 moments were used in the estimation for university graduates and 407 
moments were used in the estimation for non university graduates.  
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A.3.2 Models for annual employment  
We define an individual to be non-employed in year 𝜂𝜂 if they are observed to have annual 
earnings less than £1,000 in that year. We estimate three models for employment 
dynamics: the probability of moving from employment to non-employment, the probability 
of moving from non-employment to employment, and the annual earnings of re-employed 
workers.  
Exit to non-employment 
The probability of a currently employed worker becoming non-employed is assumed to 
be a probit model with age and log earnings as independent variables. Age enters as a 
quartic polynomial. Log earnings enter as a quadratic polynomial.  
Entry to employment 
The probability of a previously non-employed worker becoming employed is assumed to 
be a probit model with age and duration of non-employment as independent variables. 
Age enters as a quartic polynomial. Duration enters as dummy variables for up to one 
year, one to two years and more than two years.  
Re-entry earnings  
Log earnings of a previously non-employed worker are assumed to be a function of age, 
duration of non-employment and last log annual earnings before becoming non-
employed. Age enters as a quartic polynomial. Duration enters as dummy variables for 
up to one year and more than one year. Last log annual earnings enter linearly.  
A.3.3 Simulating the BHPS model for earnings and employment  
The estimated earnings and employment models are simulated alongside each other, 
using the simulated earnings as inputs to determine both the probability of becoming 
non-employed and the re-entry earnings upon re-employment. The only thing that 
remains to be specified is how the stochastic (random) component of earnings upon re-
employment is divided between the persistent and transitory components. This is done 
differently for males and females. For males, it is assumed that the transitory component 
is equal to the stochastic component of the re-entry earnings equation; the persistent 
component is equal to the remainder. For females, it is assumed that the persistent 
component is a weighted average of the persistent component as just described for 
males, and a random draw from the unconditional distribution of the persistent 
component (assuming full employment) at the relevant age; the weights used are 0.35 on 
the former and 0.65 on the latter. These specifications were chosen because they were 
found to generate employment patterns and re-entry earnings distributions that match the 
BHPS well at each age.  
To generate a simulated series for raw earnings from the simulated series for logs, we 
first add back the estimated quartic age profile from the first-stage regression. Next we 
randomly assign each simulated individual to a region–ethnicity group, according to the 
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observed region–ethnicity distribution. We then add back the relevant region–ethnicity 
constants. Finally, we add back the intercept term that corresponds to the year effect for 
the most recent year (2008) and exponentiate log earnings to obtain raw earnings.  
A.3.4 Adjusting for consistency with the LFS 
The final step is to adjust the cross-sectional distributions of non-zero earnings to be 
consistent with the observed cross-sectional distributions of non-zero earnings in the 
Labour Force Survey (LFS). To do this, we calculate the following percentiles of the log-
earnings distribution in the LFS at each age:, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, 40, 45, 
50, 55, 60, 65, 70, 75, 80, 85, 90, 95 and 99. Each percentile is smoothed across ages 
using a five-point moving average.  
For each simulated log-earnings realisation, we calculate its rank in the simulated 
distribution at that age. We then re-assign it the corresponding log earnings from the 
smoothed percentiles in the LFS, using linear interpolation to evaluate ranks that lie 
between the percentiles listed above. Two things should be noted. First, non-employed 
simulations (i.e. those with zero earnings) are not affected by this transformation; hence, 
the fraction of people employed at each age is left unchanged. Second, since annual 
earnings in the LFS are calculated as weekly earnings multiplied by 52, it is likely that the 
LFS overstates earnings in the bottom parts of the distribution, due to the presence of 
part-year workers.  
A.3.5 Goodness-of-fit of the earnings and employment model  
It is very important that the model delivers a good fit of the data since we rely heavily on 
its predictions to compute the effect of pre-school quality on lifetime earnings. Figures 
A.3.1 and A.3.2 compare the data with the predictions of the model on several 
dimensions of earnings and employment. In the interests of space, we only report such 
goodness-of-fit exercises for male and female university graduates, but the patterns are 
similar for the other educational categories.  
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19Figure A.3.1: Goodness-of-fit of the earnings and employment model for male university 
graduates 
 
20Figure A.3.2: Goodness-of-fit of the earnings and employment model for female university 
graduates 
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Appendix B: Income imputation 
Parental income is required for determining EMA eligibility. However it is not observed in 
the data, and is instead estimated using background characteristics of individuals in the 
National Pupil Database (NPD) dataset. The estimation process is described in more 
detail in Section B.1, while the accuracy of prediction is discussed in Section B.2.  
B.1 Creation of the socio-economic index  
Since parental income is not observed, it has to be estimated based on background 
characteristics of the individuals. The background characteristics are combined using 
principal components analysis to create one continuous socio-economic status (SES) 
index. A summary of the variables included in the principal components, and their 
respective factor loadings, is given in Table B.1.1. Income is assigned using the SES 
index by matching individuals by their percentile rank in the SES index to the income at 
the respective percentile rank in the income distribution taken from the Family Resources 
Survey (FRS).  
22Table B.1.1: Creation of the SES index 
Factor Factor 
Loading 
Factor Factor 
Loading 
FSM 0.26 KS2 Score -0.23 
IMD Score 0.45 KS2 Missing  0.18 
IDACI Score 0.46 Asian 0.14 
ACORN Score 0.38 Black  0.16 
ACORN Missing -0.43 Other/Mixed 0.09 
% of Households 
Owner-Occupied 
-0.01 White  -0.23 
B.2 Assessment of the validity of the income imputation 
In this section, we use the Longitudinal Survey of Young People in England (LSYPE) to 
assess the validity of our income imputation. We merge individuals in the NPD with their 
background characteristics to the LSYPE, which includes parental income and responses 
to questions about EMA receipt. There are 10,708 individuals who appear in both 
datasets.  
Using this subsample of the main dataset, we can investigate how well we assign EMA 
eligibility to individuals. Table B.2.1 shows a comparison of actual EMA eligibility 
according to parental earnings in the LSYPE,49 and predicted EMA eligibility based on 
49 In fact we rank parental income and assign eligibility based on the same percentile ranks as we use to allocate eligibility using 
the SES measure. We do this to keep the overall eligible proportion fixed, and because we do not think parental income in the 
LSYPE is completely reliable.  
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our income imputation technique. The table shows that of those individuals we assign as 
being ineligible, 65.6% are ineligible according to their parental income. Of those we 
assign as eligible, 75.2% are actually eligible. 
23Table B.2.1: Predicted versus actual EMA eligibility using LSYPE income  
 Predicted EMA (%) N 
0 1 
Actual EMA (%) 0 65.6 24.8 4,497 1 34.4 75.2 6,211 
N 4,510 6,198 10,708 
0 indicates ineligible, 1 indicates eligible.  
 
This shows that the misclassification error is quite high. Misclassification will result in an 
underestimate of the true effect, as participation may not drop as much in our treated 
group if it includes ineligible individuals, while participation may drop in our control group 
due to the presence of eligible individuals.  
We investigate the possibility that these misclassifications are driven by poor responses 
to the parental income question in Table B.2.2. In this, we use questions about EMA 
receipt in the LSYPE to determine eligibility instead of income. The question is only 
answered by individuals in education, which explains the reduced sample size in the 
table. The implications for the success of our EMA allocation for this table are similar to 
those for Table B.2.1.  
24Table B.2.2: Predicted versus actual EMA eligibility using LSYPE EMA receipt questions 
 Predicted EMA (%) N 
0 1 
Actual EMA (%) 0 72.1 31.3 4,095 1 28.0 68.7 4,050 
N 3,681 4,464 8,145 
0 indicates ineligible, 1 indicates eligible.  
 
To try to improve the success of the allocation mechanism, we tried changing the set of 
background characteristics used to generate the SES index, and we tried to predict 
income through a regression-based approach. However neither approach was able to 
improve our prediction accuracy.  
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